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TERM LIMITS AND THE TENTH AMENDMENT:
THE POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY MODEL OF
RESERVED POWERS
I. INTRODUCTION
Nothing in the Constitution deprives the people of each
State of the power to prescribe the eligibility requirements
for the candidates who. seek to represent them in Congress.
The Constitution is simply silent on this question. And
where the Constitution is silent, it raises no bar to action by
the States or the people.'
In the last two elections, 24,513,439 Americans voted to limit the
terms of their congressional representatives. 2 But on May 22, 1995,
term limits came up one vote short. In a 5-4 decision, the United
States Supreme Court struck down an Arkansas term limit statute,
holding that states cannot supplement the qualifications of their
congressional representatives beyond those specifically enumerated in
the Constitution.3 The Court's decision effectively invalidated term
limit laws passed in twenty-three states.
4
U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton5 "elicited a confrontation
among the Justices over the basic structural principles of the federal
union."6  "[A]re we," as Professor Sullivan writes, "one people
insofar as we constitute the federal government... or rather, as the
dissent would have it, [are we] irreducibly the peoples of the several
states?"'7 While the Thornton majority held that the states have "no
powers respecting the federal government unless the Constitution
1. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842, 1875 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis added).
2. David G. Savage, Supreme Court to Decide Fate of Term Limits, L.A. TIMEs, Nov.
27, 1994, at Al.
3. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. at 1845.
4. Supreme Court Strikes Down Congressional Term-Limit Laws, FACTS ON FILE,
May 25, 1995, at 371 [hereinafter Supreme Court Strikes Down].
5. 115 S. Ct. 1842 (1995).
6. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Dueling Sovereignties: U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton,
109 HARV. L. REV. 78, 80 (1995).
7. Id.
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expressly delegates them,"' the dissenters vigorously argued that "the
states may exercise all powers, even with respect to the federal
government, that the Constitution does not.., withhold." 9
In his dissent, Justice Thomas proposed a model of "reserved"
powers under the Tenth Amendment that would give the states much
greater latitude to act absent specific constitutional preemption. 0
Characterizing the states' reserved powers as a function of "popular
sovereignty" rather than of "original powers," Thomas lays the
foundation for a new and expansive approach to Tenth Amendment
jurisprudence." While the majority approaches the Qualifications
Clause 2 from a point of view of expressio unius est exclusio
alterius,13 Thomas frames the issue as whether the states have power
to act where the Constitution does not specifically preclude action.
His affirmative answer carries revolutionary implications for those
who advocate a return to constitutional federalism. 4
8. Id. (citing Thornton, 115 S. Ct. at 1854).
9. Id. (citing Thornton, 115 S. Ct. at 1876 (Thomas, J., dissenting)).
10. Thomas argues that "where the Constitution is silent about the exercise of a
particular power-that is, where the Constitution does not speak either expressly or by
necessary implication-the Federal Government lacks that power and the States enjoy it."
Thornton, 115 S. Ct. at 1876 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Of course, Thomas's reference to
federal powers by "necessary implicati9n" raises the problem that has plagued Tenth
Amendment enthusiasts: What to do about the expansive power of Congress under both
the Commerce Clause and the Spending Clause? Long viewed as independent grants of
federal power, these two provisions in the Constitution have been construed so broadly
as to eclipse the Tenth Amendment. See generally Anthony B. Ching, Traveling Down the
Unsteady Path: United States v. Lopez, New York v. United States and the Tenth
Amendment, 29 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 99 (1995) (discussing the evolution of Tenth
Amendment jurisprudence under the Commerce Clause and the Spending Clause).
However, the Court's stunning decision in United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995),
may have cleared the way for a narrower reading of the Commerce Clause. Part IV.D of
this Note addresses the relationship between Lopez and Thomas's model of reserved
powers.
11. Thomas's approach is new because it involves a unique question in modem Tenth
Amendment jurisprudence. Although recent cases have addressed the Tenth Amendment
barring congressional action that Article I of the Constitution appears to authorize,
Thornton raises the question of whether Article I precludes state action that it does not
appear to forbid. See infra part IV.B.
12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 ("No Person shall be a Representative who shall not
have attained to the Age of twenty-five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the
United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which he
shall be chosen.").
13. BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 581 (6th ed. 1990) (defining the Latin maxim of
statutory construction as "the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another").
14. See H. Jefferson Powell, The Oldest Question of Constitutional Law, 79 VA. L.
REv. 633 (1993) (arguing that the United States has had no constitutional law of
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This Note contends that Justice Thomas's popular sovereignty
model of reserved powers, if adopted by a future majority, could
return significant portions of federal power to the states.15 Given the
close division of the Court, 6 whoever wins the White House this
November may decide whether the dissenters have the opportunity to
form a new majority committed to federalism. 7 Part II touches on
the definitional problems associated with any discussion of federalism
and provides a brief overview of Tenth Amendment jurisprudence.
Part III reviews the relevant facts and issues presented in Thornton
and describes the reasoning of both the majority and the dissent. Part
IV explains why Thornton involves a question of first impression in
modem federalism jurisprudence and analyzes Thornton in the
context of the Court's landmark decision in United States v. Lopez.'
Finally, Part V applies Thomas's Tenth Amendment model of
federalism for most of the last half-century). For purposes of this Note, "constitutional
federalism" is defined as the political agenda of states' rights, justified from the Tenth
Amendment perspective. President Reagan best described this political vision in his first
Inaugural Address:
"It is my intention ... to demand recognition of the distinction between the
powers granted to the federal government and those reserved to the states or to
the people. All of us need to be reminded that the federal government did not
create the states. The States created the federal government."
Ronald W. Reagan, Inaugural Address (Jan. 20,1981), quoted in RONALD REAGAN: THE
GREAT COMMUNICATOR 51 (Frederick J. Ryan, Jr. ed., 1995). Constitutional federalism
can also be expressed as "antifederalism" as defined in its original sense, connoting
resistance to centralization of power in the federal government and a preference for
leaving substantial governmental authority with the states. Sullivan, supra note 6, at 80
n.18.
15. Indeed, Thomas's opinions in the 1994 Term of the Supreme Court were "redolent
of first principles and revolutionary gesture." Charles Fried, Foreword: Revolutions?, 109
HARV. L. REV. 13, 13 (1995). As Charles Fried, Associate Justice of the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court, writes:
Twice Justice Thomas, reaching back to the original vision of the Constitution's
Framers, asserted claims about the nature of our federalism that stand in stark
contrast to the conception, grown familiar in the last three generations, of the
national regime as capable of virtually all power that the Constitution leaves to
government.
Id. (citing U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. at 1877-80 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting); United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1643-46 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (arguing for a return to the original understanding of the Commerce Clause)).
16. Justice Stevens wrote for the five-member majority, which included Justices
Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. at 1845-71. Justice Kennedy
filed a separate concurring opinion. la- at 1872-75. Justice Thomas wrote for the four-
member dissent. Id. at 1875-94 (Thomas, J., dissenting). He was joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, and Justices O'Connor and Scalia. Id.
17. See infra part IV.C.
18. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
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reserved powers to test the constitutionality of the Brady Handgun
Control Act.'9
II. FEDERALISM AND THE TENTH AMENDMENT
A. The Oldest Question in Constitutional Law20
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor has described the question of "the
proper division of authority between the Federal Government and the
States" as "perhaps our oldest question of constitutional law."'"
Unfortunately, "[t]alking about federalism feels a bit like joining the
proverbial blind men trying to describe an elephant. It's such a big
topic, one can't possibly hope to grasp more than a small part of the
beast."'  The threshold problem in surveying this vast field is
definitional-what federalism "is" and what it "means" looks different
depending on the area examined and the question asked.' To make
matters worse, since the New Deal era, the Supreme Court has failed
to adopt a sustainable and coherent legal basis for federalism:
In a polity called the United States of America, one might
assume, there could be no question about the legal character
of federalism. The very name suggests the federal character
of what many Americans still refer to as "the Union." .... It
is, therefore, notable that for most of the last half-century,
the United States has had no constitutional law of federal-
ism.24
Federalism proponents fall into three principal categories: (1)
Tenth Amendment federalists, (2) Guarantee Clause federalists, and
19. 18 U.S.C. § 922(s) (1994). The Brady Act, passed in 1993 as an amendment to the
Gun Control Act of 1968, imposes a waiting period of up to five days for the purchase of
a handgun and subjects purchasers to a background check during that period. The back-
ground checks must be performed by the Chief Law Enforcement Officer (CLEO) of the
prospective purchaser's place of residence. 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(2) (1994).
20. For a brief and informative historical review of federalism, see Powell, supra note
14.
21. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992).
22. Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1485 (1994).
23. Id. at 1486.
24. Powell, supra note 14, at 633. Professor Charles L. Black has written that "[t]he
issue.., is not whether our federal system.., has any basis. It has a basis in the political
structure of the national government .... The issue, rather, is whether the federal system
has any legal substance, any core of constitutional right that courts will enforce." Id.
(quoting CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., PERSPECTIVES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 29 (rev. ed.
1970)).
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(3) political process federalists.' As discussed in detail in the
following section, the Supreme Court has used the Tenth Amendment
on two occasions in recent years to invalidate congressional laws on
federalism grounds.2 6  The Court's 1992 decision in New York v.
United States reenergized Tenth Amendment federalists and made
"federalism claims a growth industry for future litigation." 27 Tenth
Amendment federalists contend that otherwise valid congressional
acts are always subject to scrutiny under the Tenth Amendment and
that federal laws that "coerce" states to pass state legislation to
implement federal policy violate state sovereignty under the Tenth
Amendment.'
Guarantee Clause29 federalists argue that "the states cannot
enjoy republican governments unless they retain sufficient autonomy
to establish and maintain their own forms of government," which
"implies a modest restraint on federal power to interfere with state
autonomy.""0 This school of thought maintains that the Guarantee
Clause is the textual embodiment of structural concerns of the
Constitution which clearly contemplates a federal system." Guaran-
tee Clause federalists encourage courts evaluating federal intrusions
into state autonomy to begin their analysis with the Guarantee
Clause, not the Tenth Amendment.32
25. See Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy:
Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1988).
26. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); National League of Cities v.
Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469
U.S. 528 (1985). The Supreme Court's recent decision in United States v. Lopez, 115 S.
Ct. 1624 (1995) (striking down the Gun Free School Zones Act of 1990 on Commerce
Clause grounds) and the dissent in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842
(1995), fit neatly into this recent trend of the Court toward federalism and states' rights.
27. Erwin Chemerinsky, Is the Rehnquist Court Really That Conservative?: An
Analysis of the 1991-92 Term, 26 CREIGHTON L. REv. 987, 990 (1993) ("The Court's
failure to adopt a clear standard [in New York v. United States] to guide courts applying
the Tenth Amendment will lead to numerous challenges to federal laws .. "). Professor
Chemerinsky's prediction has come true. See, e.g., Mack v. United States, 66 F.3d 1025
(9th Cir. 1995) (sheriffs unsuccessfully challenge the Brady Handgun Control Act on Tenth
Amendment grounds).
28. New York, 505 U.S. at 166. New York will be discussed in greater detail in the
following section of this Note. See infra part II.B.4.
29. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 ("The United States shall ... guarantee to every State in
this Union a Republican Form of Government.").
30. Merritt, supra note 25, at 2.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1-2.
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Finally, process federalists leave the question of the proper
division of authority between the Federal Government and the states
to the political process itself, choosing to remove the courts from the
fray altogether.33 This approach holds that courts should not
invalidate federal statutes for intruding on "traditional functions" of
state government because "the principal means chosen by the Framers
to ensure the role of the States in the federal system lies in the
structure of the Federal Government itself."3'
B. Tenth Amendment JurisprudenceY
The Supreme Court has struggled for two hundred years to
"reconcile the conflicting demands of state autonomy and national
supremacy., 36 The Tenth Amendment has been at the heart of this
struggle, and Tenth Amendment jurisprudence evolved as the
Supreme Court's vision of the proper role of the federal government
changed.37 Since many of the early cases involving the expansion of
federal power dealt with the Commerce Clause,38 the evolution of
Tenth Amendment jurisprudence is intertwined with the evolution of
the Commerce Clause.39 The historical development of the Tenth
33. The Supreme Court briefly embraced this approach in Garcia. However, the
Court reasserted its authority to invalidate federal laws based on the Tenth Amendment
seven years later in New York.
34. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 550. However, Garcia's rationale that the structure of federal
politics protects the autonomy of the states "is simply wishful thinking." Merritt, supra
note 25, at 15. In fact, this theory is "so implausible ... as virtually to compel one's
skepticism that those who assert [it] can possibly believe it .... [I]t is difficult to take the
political science portion of the whole 'safeguards' argument as other than a good-hearted
joke." William W. Van Alstyne, The Second Death of Federalism, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1709,
1724 n.64 (1985).
35. For an excellent summary of Tenth Amendment jurisprudence from the Marshall
Court to the present, see Ching, supra note 10.
36. Merritt, supra note 25, at 1.
37. Ching, supra note 10, at 103.
38. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("The Congress shall have Power... [t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes
.... "). Beginning in 1937, the Supreme Court adopted a lenient "rational basis test" in
Commerce Clause cases, upholding an exercise of commerce authority so long as Congress
could have rationally concluded that the statute would accomplish the aim of regulating
interstate commerce. See, e.g., Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452
U.S. 264, 276 (1981). However, after more than 60 years on the sidelines, the Supreme
Court has returned to the business of drawing boundaries between federal and state
authority on Commerce Clause grounds. See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624,1634
(1995) (overturning a federal law forbidding firearms within 1,000 feet of a school as
beyond Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce).
39. Ching, supra note 10, at 103.
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Amendment breaks down into four principal stages: the Marshall
Court (1819-1888), the "Dual Federalism" era (1888-1937), the New
Deal (1937-1976), and the Modem Revival (1976-present). 4
1. The Marshall Court
Two landmark cases marked the expansion of federal power
during the tenure of Chief Justice John Marshall-McCulloch v.
Maryland4 and Gibbons v. Ogden.42 The question presented in
McCulloch was whether the State of Maryland had the power to tax
a bank chartered by Congress.43 Marshall wrote that an "original
right to tax" such federal entities "never existed, and the question
whether it has been surrendered, cannot arise."'  Marshall rejected
Maryland's argument that the Constitution's silence on the subject of
state power to tax corporations chartered by Congress implies that the
states have reserved power to tax federal instrumentalities.45 He
construed federal power broadly, declaring that "all means which are
appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that [legitimate] end, which
are not prohibited, but consistent with the letter and spirit of the
constitution, are constitutional."'  In this pro-government Federalist
victory, Marshall appears to have rejected the Tenth Amendment as
an active limitation on federal power.
Gibbons addressed whether the State of New York could grant
licenses for ships to operate between New York and New Jersey
despite a federal law licensing ships to engage in coastal trade.47 The
Marshall Court held that states may regulate intrastate commerce, but
when these state laws conflict with federal laws enacted pursuant to
the Commerce Clause, federal law preempts.' Marshall's interpreta-
tion of the Commerce Clause in Gibbons was broad in two respects.
First, he defined "commerce" broadly as including the right to
40. A thorough review of the history of the Tenth Amendment is far beyond the scope
of this Note. The following text aims to place the Tenth Amendment in proper historical
context and describe the various cases which are important to understanding the Supreme
Court's discussion in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842 (1995).
41. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
42. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
43. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 317-21.
44. Id. at 430.
45. Id. at 432-33.
46. Id. at 421 (footnote omitted).
47. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 1-3.
48. Id. at 210.
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seafaring navigation, not just "commodities."4 9 According to Mar-
shall, commerce "among the states" involved more than merely trans-
actions between states; it also includes anything that affects other
states, even if the activity is strictly intrastate. ° Second, Marshall
reasoned that congressional power to regulate commerce is unlimited
so long as Congress can point to an enumerated end.51 Thus, so long
as Congress's purpose is somehow linked to an enumerated power,
the Commerce Clause effectively negates the Tenth Amendment as
a limitation on federal power.
2. The "dual federalism" era
The "Civil War and its aftermath inaugurated an era in which
Congress began to act more vigorously" in regulating interstate
commerce.52 Congress's regulatory efforts generated fierce opposi-
tion from interest groups newly burdened by federal limitations on
interstate commerce." These groups challenged many of the new
federal laws, contending that only the states could regulate their
activities.' In response, the Supreme Court began to limit the
federal government's power by defining commerce more narrowly.55
Seventy-four years after Gibbons, the Supreme Court retreated
from Marshall's vision of a strong federal government in United States
v. E.C. Knight Co.56 The issue in E.C. Knight concerned whether
the federal government could invoke the Sherman Antitrust Act to
break up a sugar refining monopoly.5 The Supreme Court held that
the Sherman Act did not affect the monopoly because the Commerce
Clause proscribed Congress from regulating intrastate manufactur-
ing.58 The Court argued that manufacturing was a "local" step in the
chain of production and not "commerce" subject to federal control. 59
By drawing distinctions among the different steps in the chain of
49. Id. at 189-90.
50. Id. at 194.
51. Id. at 196.
52. GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 151 (2d ed. 1991). Examples
of new congressional activism in economic regulation include the Interstate Commerce Act
of 1887 and the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See id. at 168.
56. 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
57. Id. at 11.
58. Id. at 17.
59. Id. at 12-15.
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production, the Court used the Tenth Amendment to reserve the
regulation of some economic activities to the states. This approach
came to be known as "dual federalism."'
In 1918 the Supreme Court in Hammer v. Dagenhart61 struck
down a federal law prohibiting the interstate transportation of goods
manufactured by child labor.62 Hammer "put the brake on the
expansion of Congress's Commerce Clause power" and "stood as the
zenith of states' rights and, correspondingly, private property rights to
be free from government regulati6n."'63 The Supreme Court articu-
lated another approach to limiting federal power under the Commerce
Clause in Carter v. Carter Coal Co.' Carter addressed the constitu-
tionality of the New Deal-era Bituminous Coal Conservation Act as
an exercise of congressional power.' The Court found that coal
manufacturing was a local activity and that local manufacturing had
only an "indirect" effect on interstate commerce.' The Court
distinguished among activities which directly or indirectly affected
interstate commerce and held that the federal government could only
regulate activities that directly affected interstate commerce.67
3. The New Deal
After the election of Franklin Roosevelt to the presidency in
1932, Congress enacted a series of statutes designed to remedy the
economic and social ills associated with the Great Depression.'
Many business interests opposed much of the New Deal legislation
contending that it interfered with private property rights and
encroached upon the proper domain of the states.69 Beginning in
1934, the Supreme Court struck down much of this New Deal
legislation on both Due Process and Tenth Amendment grounds. 7
60. See Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REV. 1, 4
(1950).
61. 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
62. Id. at 276-77.
63. Ching, supra note 10, at 107.
64. 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
65. Id. at 278.
66. Id. at 304-05.
67. Id. at 305.
68. STONE ET AL., supra note 52, at 167-68.
69. Id. at 168.
70. The three major cases decided on Tenth Amendment grounds were Carter v.
Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (striking down the Bituminous Coal Conservation
Act of 1935); Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (striking down
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These decisions outraged New Deal supporters. Following his
massive victory in the 1936 election, President Roosevelt set out to
remake the Supreme Court by proposing his infamous "court
packing" scheme.71 Although FDR's plan encountered substantial
opposition, by the summer of 1937 the Senate was prepared to adopt
a modified version of the court-packing plan.' However, before the
Senate Judiciary Committee could vote on the matter, the Supreme
Court did an about-face in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish.73 In
what became known as "the switch in time that saved Nine," Justice
Roberts, who had previously voted to invalidate New Deal legislation,
joined the majority in upholding a state minimum wage statute.
74
The Court's reversal, coupled with the death of Senate Majority
Leader Joseph Robinson weeks before the Senate vote, led to the
defeat of FDR's court-packing scheme in July 1937.' 5
The Supreme Court decided cases over the next several years
that vastly increased Congress's Commerce Clause power and gutted
the Tenth Amendment of any real meaning.76 In NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp.," the Court upheld the National Labor Rela-
tions Act. regulating unfair labor practices, broadly construing
congressional power over conduct affecting commerce.78 In Wickard
v. Filburn79 the Court upheld the Agricultural Adjustment Act of
1938 establishing wheat production quotas for individual farmers.8"
Beginning with these two cases, the Court adopted a lenient rational
basis test in Commerce Clause cases, validating an exercise of
commerce authority provided Congress could have concluded
rationally that the statute would accomplish the aim of regulating
interstate commerce.81
the minimum hour and wage provisions of the Live Poultry Code); Railroad Retirement
Board v. Alton R.R., 295 U.S. 330 (1935) (striking down the Railroad Retirement Act of
1934).
71. See STONE ET AL., supra note 52, at 180 ("Seizing on the fact that six justices were
over seventy years old in 1937, Roosevelt proposed that one additional justice, up to a
total of fifteen, be appointed for each justice over seventy who did not resign or retire.").
72. See id. at 180-81.
73. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
74. STONE ET AL., supra note 52, at 181.
75. Id.
76. See Ching, supra note 10, at 107-10.
77. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
78. Id. at 49.
79. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
80. Id. at 129.
81. See, e.g., Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264,277
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In United States v. Darby," the Supreme Court "relegated the
Tenth Amendment to the status of mere window dressing," effectively
reading it out of the Constitution for the next thirty-five years.83
Darby involved a criminal violation of the minimum wage provision
of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. 4 In its discussion of the
Tenth Amendment, the Court declared:
The amendment states but a truism that all is retained which
has not been surrendered. There is nothing in the history of
its adoption to suggest that it was more than declaratory of
the relationship between the national and state governments
as it had been established by the Constitution before the
amendment ....
In holding that the Tenth Amendment states "but a truism," the
Court eliminated the Tenth Amendment as a basis for declaring
federal laws unconstitutional.86 The New Deal Court believed that
the Tenth Amendment no longer reserved a "zone of activities for
exclusive state regulation and control" and deferred the question of
states' rights to the political process.'
4. Modem revival
From the "New Deal until the mid-1970s, the political branches
of the federal government acted on the assumption, invariably
confirmed by the Supreme Court, that there is no 'legal substance,
[no] core of constitutional right' limiting national power in the
interests of federalism."'  In 1976, however, the Supreme Court
revived the Tenth Amendment in National League of Cities v.
Usery. 9 In a 5-4 decision, the Court held that the Fair Labor
Standards Act's wage and overtime provisions, as applied to state and
(1981). NLRB established what has come to be known as the "affection doctrine": If the
activity subject to regulation affects interstate commerce in any way, the regulation is
constitutional. In Wickard, the Court employed the concept of "aggregation" by looking
at the cumulative economic effect of personal wheat consumption on interstate commerce.
Wickard, 317 U.S. at 127-28.
82. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
83. Ching, supra note 10, at 110.
84. Darby, 312 U.S. at 109-10.
85. Id. at 124 (emphasis added).
86. Chemerinsky, supra note 27, at 988.
87. Id.
88. Powell, supra note 14, at 634.
89. 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (overruling Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968)).
1173
1174 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:1163
local government employees, violated the Tenth Amendment." The
Court declared that the Tenth Amendment provided an affirmative
check on congressional power: "[T]here are attributes of sovereignty
attaching to every state government which may not be impaired by
Congress, not because Congress lacks an affirmative grant of
legislative authority to reach the matter, but because the Constitution
prohibits it from exercising the authority in that manner." 91
National League of Cities sparked a "roar of criticism from the
academy"' because the Court failed to articulate a clear standard
"for when federal laws impermissibly usurped state functions."'93 The
legitimacy of National League of Cities was eroded over the next nine
years as the Court struggled to apply the case to other state challeng-
es of federal laws.94 Indeed, the Court found it so difficult to invoke
the Tenth Amendment against federal laws that it was never able to
actually use National League of Cities to invalidate a federal law.95
The Court finally abandoned its efforts to define an administrable
Tenth Amendment standard in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority.96 Garcia overruled National League of Cities by
permitting the application of the Fair Labor Standards Act to state
and local government employeesY Frustrated with the difficult task
of "drawing a line between what is properly the national power and
what is properly the states' power,"9" the Garcia Court concluded
that the national political process afforded the best protection for
states' interests.9 The Court reasoned that "since Congress is com-
posed of elected representatives from the States, States' interests were
90. Ching, supra note 10, at 111.
91. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 845.
92. Powell, supra note 14, at 634.
93. Chemerinsky, supra note 27, at 989.
94. See, e.g., EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983) (upholding extension of age
discrimination legislation to state and local government employers as a valid exercise of
commerce power not precluded by Tenth Amendment); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742
(1982) (upholding federal scheme of regulating public utilities, despite the fact that
regulating utilities was traditionally a state function); United Transp. Union v. Long Island
R.R., 455 U.S. 678 (1982) (upholding application of federal law to a state-owned railroad,
stressing that operation of railroads is not a traditional function of state and local
governments); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981)
(upholding federal scheme of regulating surface mining on nonfederal land).
95. See Chemerinsky, supra note 27, at 989.
96. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
97. Id. at 552-54.
98. Ching, supra note 10, at 113.
99. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 552.
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protected by their elected representatives."'" Garcia appeared to
once again remove the federal judiciary from the role of interpreting
and enforcing the Tenth Amendment.' 1
Seven years later, however, in New York v. United States"° the
Court "resurrected the Tenth Amendment and returned it to the juris-
diction of the judicial branch.""0 3  The State of New York chal-
lenged the federal Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments
Act of 1985."' The Act provided for penalties against states that
did not enter into regional agreements for the disposal of radioactive
waste."0 5 Instead of creating a federal program to dispose of such
waste under its Commerce Clause powers, Congress passed the Act
to force the states to take action in developing adequate disposal sites
either in-state or by regional agreements." States failing to comply
with the act would be forced to take title to all the waste and become
liable as the owner of the waste."°
The Supreme Court held that the "take title" provision violated
the Tenth Amendment.s The Court reasoned that federal laws
that "coerce" states to pass state legislation to implement federal
policies violate state sovereignty under the Tenth Amendment:
[T]he second alternative held out to state govern-
ments-regulating pursuant to Congress' direction-would,
standing alone, present a simple command to state govern-
ments to implement legislation enacted by Congress. As we
have seen, the Constitution does not empower Congress to
subject state governments to this type of instruction."°9
100. Ching, supra note 10, at 114. Ching points out that "Garcia, like Darby before it,
expressed the philosophy that the Tenth Amendment was nothing more than a statement
of political policy without the force of affirmative prohibition on Congressional action."
Id.
101. In his brief dissent, Justice Rehnquist predicted that "in time again [judicial
enforcement of the Tenth Amendment will] command the support of a majority of this
Court." Garcia, 469 U.S. at 580 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
102. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
103. Ching, supra note 10, at 118.
104. New York, 505 U.S. at 149.
105. Id. at 152-54.
106. Id. at 150-51.
107. Id.
108. New York, 505 U.S. at 166 (The Constitution "confers upon Congress the power
to regulate individuals, not States .... [E]ven where Congress has the authority under
the Constitution to pass laws requiring or prohibiting certain acts, it lacks the power
directly to compel the States to require or prohibit those acts.").
109. Id. at 175-76.
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The Tenth Amendment makes it clear that "[t]he Federal Govern-
ment may not compel the States to enact or administer a federal
regulatory program."'' °  Despite its brief retreat in Garcia, the
Supreme Court has once again asserted its authority to interpret and
enforce the Tenth Amendment as an active limit on federal power.
The Tenth Amendment is no longer a mere "truism," but a powerful
tool in the legal battle to revive federalism.
C The Values of Federalism..
Professor Kramer writes that federalism is a theory of institu-
tions:
A federal system is one in which political power is divided
between central and subordinate authorities ... [and] the
subordinate units possess enclaves of jurisdiction that cannot
be invaded by the central government. ... [T]he critical
feature of a federal system is that officials of the subordinate
units are not appointed, and cannot be fired, by officials of
the central government.
112
But why is a federal system preferable to, say, a unitary system
where the federal government exercises complete control over state
agencies? What is so inherently valuable about federalism that
inspired the Framers to draft a Constitution designed to produce
vertical separation of powers?"' While many argue that states have
outlived their usefulness as the American economy and culture have
become truly national,1 4 the American federal system is far from an
110. Id. at 188.
111. For an excellent overview of the positive features of federalism, see Merritt, supra
note 25. The author has drawn heavily from the sources noted in Professor Merritt's
article.
112. Kramer, supra note 22, at 1488 n.5.
113. Actually, the Framers were probably just being pragmatic; American federalism
is more a product of political compromise than political theory. Merritt, supra note 25,
at 3. Indeed, "[f]ederalism was the means and price of the formation of the Union."
Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 543
(1954).
114. "Opponents of state sovereignty view the federal system as an outdated relic of
the colonial period." Merritt, supra note 25, at 2. Some critics also contend that
federalism hampers the resolution of serious national problems and perpetuates racism and
other malignant political agendas. See, e.g., Jesse Choper, The Scope of National Power
Vis-a-Vis the States: The Dispensability of Judicial Review, 86 YALE L.J. 1552, 1618-19
(1977); Alpheus Thomas Mason, JudicialActivism: Old and New, 55 VA. L. REV. 385,391
(1969) (judicial doctrine of dual federalism was a "lethal weapon.., stalling government
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anachronism. Federalism protects the American people from
excessive government power, encourages grassroots political participa-
tion, promotes ethnic, gender, and political diversity, and paves the
way for innovative leadership in public policy."5 The following four
values of federalism are timeless, bridging the vast expanse of time
from the Framing to the twenty-first century.
1. States protect liberty
Federalism guards against the concentration of power in the
federal government through a "vertical" separation of powers. James
Madison argued that the division of powers between national and
state governments would check abuses of government power:
In the compound republic of America, the power surren-
dered by the people is first divided between two distinct
governments [federal and state], and then the portion
allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate
departments. Hence, a double security arises to the rights of
the people. The different governments will control each
other, at the same time that each will be controlled by
itself."6
Alexander Hamilton agreed, writing in Federalist No. 28 that
"[p]ower being almost always the rival of power, the general
government will at all times stand ready to check the usurpations of
the State governments, and [state governments] will have the same
disposition towards the general government."
' 1 7
State governments obviously cannot check national power like
the President checks the Congress through the veto, and state
governments must "yield gracefully" when the "federal government
chooses to preempt a field within its delegated powers."' 8 Howev-
er, state governments can restrain national power by opposing federal
policies in the courts" 9 and in Congress, 12 by regulating areas that
action amid economic crisis 'more serious than war' ").
115. See infra parts II.C.1-4.
116. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 349 (James Madison) (C. Van Doren ed., 1973).
117. THE FEDERALIST No. 28, at 178 (Alexander Hamilton) (C. Van Doren ed., 1973).
118. Merritt, supra note 25, at 5.
119. "When the Reagan administration attacked quotas and other types of affirmative
action for minorities, several states and cities defended those practices in complex
lawsuits." Id.; see, e.g., Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987) (county
agency defended affirmative action plan in suit that lasted six years and reached the
Supreme Court); Local Number 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478
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the Congress ignores,"2 and by providing political parties that lack
national power with a grassroots power base." By virtue of the
very structure of American politics, states possess significant means
by which to restrain the exercise of national power, guarding against
the excessive concentration of federal power.
2. States are closer to the people
State and local governments are more accessible to the people,
encouraging greater citizen participation in civic affairs. "It is at the
local level-the government 'closest to the people'-that citizen
participation is most prevalent and significant."'" Thomas Jefferson
believed that public participation in government enhanced citizen
confidence in the democratic process:
Where every man is a sharer in the direction of his ward-
republic, or of some of the higher ones, and feels that he is
a participator in the government of affairs, not merely at an
election one day in the year, but every day; ... he will let
the heart be tom out of his body sooner than his power be
wrested from him by a Caesar or a Bonaparte.' 24
U.S. 501 (1986) (city defended affirmative action plan adopted in consent decree while
United States attacked the plan).
120. See, e.g., Jonathan Peterson, Governors' Budget Plan Asks Wider Role on
Medicaid, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 7,1996, at Al (seeking to break the stalemate over the federal
budget, the nation's governors proposed a bipartisan plan that included Medicaid and
welfare reform).
121. For example, although the Reagan Administration rejected the idea of comparable
worth for women, at least five states adopted comparable worth legislation in the 1980s.
Merritt, supra note 25, at 6.
122. The Republican takeover of Congress in the 1994 general elections is one example
of how the states can provide a power base for a party's return to national prominence.
See NATIONAL REPUBLICAN CONGRESSIONAL COMM., PROJECT '94: CREATIVE
CONCEPTS FOR REPUBLICAN CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGNS (1994). The National
Republican Congressional Committee (NRCC) and House Speaker Newt Gingrich's
political organization "GOPAC" conducted candidate recruitment and training programs
in conjunction with state and local GOP organizations after President Bush was defeated
for reelection in 1992. Id. GOPAC and the NRCC provided local GOP organizations and
candidates with polling data, media consulting and weekly "talking points" in their
successful effort to coordinate a unified national campaign theme. Id. GOPAC and the
NRCC relied on state and local organizations to implement and direct the "Contract with
America" campaign plan. Id.
123. ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, CITIZEN PARTICIPA-
TION IN THE AMERICAN FEDERAL SYSTEM 8 (1980).
124. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Joseph C. Cabell (Feb. 2, 1816), quoted in THE
POLITICAL WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 99 (Edward Dumbauld ed., 1985).
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Citizen participation in state and local government also trains people
in the techniques of democracy and fosters accountability among
elected officials.125
3. States promote diversity
Because state and local governments are more effective at
drawing people into the political process, a relatively high proportion
of women and minorities hold positions in local government as
compared with the national government. For example, in 1985,
women held 14.4% of the seats in state legislatures, three times the
proportion of seats they held in Congress.1 26  African-Americans
held five percent of the state legislative seats compared with only
three percent in Congress, and another 2,685 African-Americans
served as mayors or members of city governing boards. 27 In short,
federalism promotes gender and ethnic diversity in American politics.
Federalism also promotes political diversity as "citizens in each
state create the type of social and political climate they prefer.""t
While Alaska chooses to spend $8,627 per pupil for elementary and
secondary education, Utah chooses to spend only $2,053.129 Similar-
ly, while Wisconsin has chosen to implement a school choice program
allowing parents to send their children to private schools, California
has expressly rejected the "voucher" approach to education re-
form.130  Federalism empowers people to express their different
social and cultural values through the state legislative process.
125. Merritt, supra note 25, at 7-8. But see Mark Tushnet, Federalism and the
Traditions of American Political Theory, 19 GA. L. REV. 981, 991-92 (1985) (contending
that contemporary politics belie the republican theory of accountability to active local
participants).
126. Merritt, supra note 25, at 8 (citing States Are Found More Responsive on Social
Issues, N.Y. TIMEs, May 19, 1985, at 1, 32).
127. Merritt, supra note 25, at 8.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 8-9.
130. Compare Wis. STAT. § 119.23 (1990) (providing every child from a low-income
family with a voucher payment to be used to cover the child's full tuition at any qualifying
private.school) with Proposition 174, California Ballot Pamphlet, Nov. 2, 1993, at 32
(proposing to provide every parent, regardless of income, with a school voucher worth
aproximately 50% of the prior year cost-per-student tuition cost). While the State of
Wisconsin enacted its voucher program through legislative means, California voucher
proponents attempted to pass its program by initiative. However, California voters
overwhelmingly rejected Proposition 174 in a 1993 special election. Election '93, CAL. J.
WKLY., Sept. 27, 1993, at 2.
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4. States encourage innovation
As Justice Brandeis observed, the "[s]tate[s] ... serve as a
laboratory" to "try novel social and economic experiments without
risk to the rest of the country." 3 ' Strong state governments repre-
sent a principal source of governmental innovation.13 Indeed,
"[u]nemployment compensation, minimum-wage laws, public financing
of political campaigns, no-fault insurance, hospital cost containment,
and prohibitions against discrimination in housing and employment all
originated in state legislatures."'33 After proving their worth at the
state level, many of these ideas developed into federal programs)3
State governments are closer to the people and thus more responsive
to their demands for reform; consequently, the states are able to
create new and innovative programs.
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Background: The Term Limits Movement
Popular frustration with exceedingly high reelection rates among
incumbent members of Congress sparked the national term limits
movement.35 Turnover in the House of Representatives during the
1980s was almost identical to that of Great Britain's House of Lords,
who are appointed for life!136  Lee Iacocca aptly observed that
"[s]itting Congressmen are almost as likely to be sentenced to jail as
they are to be sent home by the voters. Since 1988, six Congressmen
went home and five were sentenced to the slammer."' 37  Ninety
131. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262,311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
132. See, e.g., Charles Fried, Federalism-Why Should We Care?, 6 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 1, 2-3 (1982); Henry J. Friendly, Federalism: A Foreword, 86 YALE L.J. 1019,1034
(1977).
133. Merritt, supra note 25, at 9.
134. In fact, the Constitution itself was drawn from the provisions of several state
constitutions. Id. at 9 nA6 (citing reprints of Virginia and Massachusetts constitutions in
1 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 142, at 7-9, 11-23 (P. Kurland & R. Lerner eds., 1987)).
135. See Neil Gorsuch & Michael Guzman, Will The Gentlemen Please Yield? A
Defense of the Constitutionality of State-Imposed Term Limitations, 20 HOFSTRA L. REv.
341, 341 (1991).
136. See 137 CONG. REC. S6273 (daily ed. May 22, 1991) (statement of Sen. Hank
Brown); see also Gorsuch & Guzman, supra note 135, at 341 (noting that only one
incumbent Senator was defeated in the 1990 election and that the overall reelection rate
was 96%).
137. Gorsuch & Guzman, supra note 135, at 341 (quoting Lee Iacocca, We Can't Even
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percent of all congressional incumbents over the past thirty years who
have run for reelection have been reelected.138 Justice Thomas notes
that "[e]ven in the November 1994 elections, which are widely
considered to have effected the most sweeping change in Congress in
recent memory, 90 percent of the incumbents who sought reelection
to the House were successful, and nearly half of the losers were
completing only their first terms.
'139
Realizing that high reelection rates are due in large measure to
the many advantages of incumbency,"4 political reformers in both
parties launched a grassroots movement to limit the tenure of elected
state and federal officials.1 41  On November 6, 1990, Colorado
became the first state to limit the terms of its representatives in
Congress.4 By an almost three-to-one majority, the people of
Colorado voted to prohibit their federal representatives from serving
more than twelve consecutive years in the same office. 43 The idea
caught on-in the 1992 election, voters in fourteen states approved
state initiatives to limit the terms of their federal representatives.1"
The margins of victory for these initiatives were high: Sixty-three
percent of California voters approved an initiative limiting House
members to three terms and Senators to two terms.145 Capitalizing
on growing anti-incumbent sentiment in the country, House Republi-
cans made term limits one of the prominent planks in their "Contract
Throw The Rascals Out, L.A. TIMES, May 18, 1990, at B7).
138. Lloyd N. Cutler, Now is the TimeforAll Good Men..., 30 WM. & MARY L. REV.
387, 395 (1989).
139. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842, 1912 (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(citation omitted).
140. Current federal laws confer many advantages on incumbents. For example, federal
law permits members of Congress to send "franked" mail and newsletters to constituents
at taxpayer expense, thus building name recognition among likely voters. 39 U.S.C.A.
§ 3210 (West Supp. 1995). Other provisions permit Members to hire taxpayer-funded
staffs, many of whom are really just campaign operatives. 2 U.S.C. §§ 61-1 (1994).
Campaign finance laws also give incumbents a built-in advantage because political action
committees will seldom contribute to challengers.
141. Term limits have gained the support of an unlikely bipartisan coalition, including
consumer activist Ralph Nader, presidential candidate Jerry Brown, conservative columnist
George Will, and Republican Senator Hank Brown. Gorsuch & Guzman, supra note 135,
at 342-43.
142. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., A Defense of State Constitutional Limits on Federal
Congressional Terms, 53 U. PiTt. L. REV. 97, 99 (1991).
143. Id.
144. Robert Reinhold, The 1992 Elections: The States-The Ballot Issues; Move to
Limit Terms Gathers Steam After Winning in 14 States, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1992, at B8.
145. Id.
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with America."' 46 Strong GOP support for term limits played a key
role in the Republicans gaining control of Congress in the 1994
elections.47
On November 3, 1992, Arkansas voters adopted Amendment 73
to their state constitution. 4" Amendment 73 limits the terms of
both Arkansas state and federal elected officials. 49  Section 3
provides that:
(a) Any person having been elected to three or more terms
as a member of the United States House of Representatives
from Arkansas shall not be certified as a candidate and shall
not be eligible to have his/her name placed on the ballot for
election to the United States House of Representatives from
Arkansas.
(b) Any person having been elected to two or more terms as
a member of the United States Senate from Arkansas shall
not be certified as a candidate and shall not be eligible to
have his/her name placed on the ballot for election to the
United States Senate from Arkansas.15
Bobbie Hill, on behalf of herself, "similarly situated" Arkansas
citizens, and the League of Women Voters of Arkansas, filed a
complaint on November 13, 1992, seeking to invalidate Section 3 of
Amendment 73 as "unconstitutional and void."'51  Hill filed her
complaint in the circuit court for Pulaski County, Arkansas and
"named as defendants then-Governor Clinton, other state officers, the
146. Supreme Court Strikes Down, supra note 4, at 371.
147. House Republicans' support for term limits, however, cooled considerably after
they gained control of Congress. Term limits fell 63 votes short when the issue finally
came up for a House vote in June 1995. See Rep. Bill McCollum, After Supreme Court
Decision, a Retooled Term-Limits Strategy, ROLL CALL, June 12, 1995, at 3.
148. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. at 1845.
149. Id. at 1846. Section 1 applies to state elected officials in the executive branch, and
section 2 applies to the state legislative branch. Id. These provisions were not at issue in
the case.
150. Id.
151. Id. The Supreme Court decided this action, Winston Bryant, Attorney General of
Arkansas v. Bobbie E. Hill, together with U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton on May 22,
1995. United States Representative Ray Thornton is a member of the Arkansas congres-
sional delegation who also brought suit for declaratory relief. The Court refers to these
consolidated actions simply as U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton. Ironically, just hours
after the Court ruled that Section 3 was unconstitutional, Thornton announced that he
would not seek a fourth term from Arkansas' Second Congressional District. Rex Nelson,
Will Thornton Swap House Shoes for Chief's Robes?, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETrE, May
30, 1995, at 1A.
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Republican Party of Arkansas, and the Democratic Party of Arkan-
sas."' 52 The Arkansas State Attorney General intervened on behalf
of the State of Arkansas as a party defendant in support of Amend-
ment 73.3 U.S. Term Limits, Inc., a proponent of the amendment,
also intervened as a party defendant. 1" The circuit court held that
Section 3 violated Article I of the United States Constitution.155
The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's deci-
sion.'56 Justice Robert L. Brown, writing for a plurality of three
justices, 5 7 concluded that "the congressional restrictions in Amend-
ment 73 are unconstitutional because the States have no authority 'to
change, add to, or diminish' the requirements for congressional service
enumerated in the Qualifications Clauses.' '158 Justice Brown argued
that "[i]f there is one watchword for representation of the various
states in Congress, it is uniformity .... The uniformity in qualifica-
tions mandated in Article I provides the tenor and the fabric for
representation in Congress. Piecemeal restrictions by State[s] would
fly in the face of that order."15 9 Brown also rejected the contention
that the amendment is a mere "ballot access" restriction rather than
an outright disqualification from running for office."
152. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. at 1846.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Hill, 872 S.W.2d 349 (Ark. 1994).
157. The Arkansas Supreme Court upheld the trial court in a 5-2 decision. Id The
majority, however, was unable to join in a single opinion. In separate opinions, Justice
Dudley and Justice Gerald P. Brown concluded that Amendment 73 violates the U.S.
Constitution. Justice Robert L. Brown's opinion therefore only reflected the views of
three out of seven justices. Id.
158. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. at 1846 (quoting Hill, 872 S.W.2d at 356).
159. Hill, 872 S.W.2d at 356.
160. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. at 1846. Justice Brown concluded that "[t]he intent and the
effect of Amendment 73 are to disqualify congressional incumbents from further service."
Id. He also rejected the argument that disqualified incumbents could run again as write-in
candidates because they would have virtually no chance of winning. Id. Petitioners in
Thornton also raised this argument. They asserted that even if the states may not add
qualifications, the amendment is constitutional as a permissible exercise of state power to
regulate the "Times, Places and Manner of Holding Elections." Id at 1866-67. Some term
limits proponents have also advanced this argument. See Gorsuch & Guzman, supra note
135, at 345. Justice Thomas's model of reserved powers under the Tenth Amendment,
however, arises from the question of whether the State of Arkansas can supplement the
qualifications of their congressional representatives beyond those qualifications specifically
enumerated in the Constitution. This Note focuses on whether Amendment 73 violates
the Qualifications Clauses, not whether it is a ballot access restriction.
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Justice Hay and Special Chief Justice Cracraft dissented. 1
Justice Hay concluded that Amendment 73 is constitutional "[b]ecause
his examination of the text and history of the Qualifications Clauses
convinced him that the Constitution contains no express or implicit
restriction on the States' ability to impose additional qualifications on
candidates for Congress."'1 62 Hay's approach resembles that of
Justice Thomas, starting from "the premise that all political authority
resides in the people, limited only by those provisions of the federal
or state constitutions specifically to the contrary."163 Special Chief
Justice Cracraft reasoned that the amendment does not implicate the
Qualifications Clauses because it is a permissible ballot access
restriction."
The Arkansas Attorney General and the intervenors petitioned
for writs of certiorari. 65 The Supreme Court granted both petitions
and consolidated the cases for argument."6 The Court heard oral
arguments on November 29, 1994, and affirmed the Arkansas
Supreme Court's ruling in a 5-4 decision announced on May 22,
1995.167
B. Issues Presented
The Thornton majority frames the two issues presented as (1)
whether the Constitution forbids states from adding or altering the
qualifications specifically enumerated in the Constitution, and (2) if
the Constitution does so forbid, whether the Arkansas law is
formulated as a ballot access restriction rather than an outright
disqualification."6 The first question turns on how one construes
the Qualifications Clauses and whether the power to add qualifica-
tions is part of the states' "reserved" powers under the Tenth Amend-
ment.'6 9
161. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. at 1847.
162. Id.
163. Id. (quoting Hill, 872 S.W.2d at 367); cf. id. at 1876 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("In
each State, the remainder of the people's powers-The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States,' Amdt. 10-are either
delegated to the state government or retained by the people.").
164. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. at 1847.
165. Id.
166. Bryant v. Hill, 114 S. Ct. 2703 (1994).
167. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. at 1847.
168. Id.
169. The majority concludes that the Qualifications Clauses represent an exclusive
enumeration of the qualifications of federal legislators and that the framers thereby
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Article I, Section 2, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution,
which applies to the House of Representatives, provides:
No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have
attained to the Age of twenty five Years, and been seven
Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not,
when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which he
shall be chosen.17°
Similarly, the Constitution provides the following for the Senate:
No Person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to
the Age of thirty Years, and been nine Years a Citizen of
the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an
Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen.
According to the Tenth Amendment, "[t]he powers not delegated to
the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.'
172
C. Holding and Reasoning of the Majority
The State of Arkansas argued that the Constitution does not
expressly prohibit state-added qualifications and "that Amendment 73
is therefore an appropriate exercise of a State's reserved power to
place additional restrictions on the choices that its own voters may
make."7 The Court rejected this argument on two grounds. First,
the Tenth Amendment does not "reserve" the power to add qualifica-
tions to the states. Second, even if the states possess some original
powers in this area, the Framers intended the Constitution to "divest"
the states of power to add qualifications. 4
"divested" the states of any power to add qualifications. Id. at 1854. According to the
majority, "the power to add qualifications is not part of the original powers of [state]
sovereignty." Id. Therefore, Arkansas cannot "reserve" a power under the Tenth
Amendment that did not exist before the adoption of the Constitution. Id The dissenters
reject this view, contending that the majority fundamentally misunderstands the notion of
reserved powers. Id. at 1875 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Because all power stems from the
consent of the people, reserved powers include all those that are not specifically granted
to the federal government by the Constitution. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). The
Qualifications Clauses therefore only represent minimum qualifications and are not
intended to be an exclusive formulation. Id. at 1886 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
170. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 2, cl. 2.
171. Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 3.
172. Id. amend. X.
173. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. at 1853.
174. Id. at 1854.
1185
1186 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:1163
The majority holds that the power to add qualifications for
congressional representatives is not within the "original powers" of
state sovereignty and thus is not "reserved" to the states by the Tenth
Amendment."5 Justice Stevens argues that the Tenth Amendment
can only "reserve" to the states powers that existed prior to the
ratification of the Constitution."6  The majority quotes Justice
Joseph Story in support of its view of reserved powers: "[T]he states
can exercise no powers whatsoever, which exclusively spring out of
the existence of the national government, which the constitution does
not delegate to them.... No state can say, that it has reserved, what
it never possessed."'" According to this "original powers" view, the
only powers reserved to the states are those that the states enjoyed
prior to the framing of the Constitution."8
Because the qualifications for congressional service are a creature
of the Constitution, the "right" to set qualifications did not exist
175. Id. The majority also rejects the argument that Amendment 73 is a permissible
exercise of state power to regulate the "Times, Places and Manner of Holding Elections."
Id. at 1866-67. For the reasons stated in note 196 infra, however, this Note does not focus
on this aspect of the case.
Assuming, arguendo, that Amendment 73 is a permissible ballot access measure, can
the Arkansas legislature delegate this power to the people of Arkansas directly? In the
absence of the Tenth Amendment, the Arkansas legislature might not be able to delegate
to the people the concurrent authority to create ballot restrictions. However, the presence
of the Tenth Amendment means that unless the Constitution specifically prohibits such
delegation, the states and the people of the states have reserved that option. Specifically,
the Tenth Amendment reserves the option for the people to propose legislation directly
through initiatives. It would be incongruous for the Tenth Amendment to protect the
initiative process in all areas except where the people of the states wish to pass ballot
access measures.
The Ninth Amendment further bolsters this contention that the state legislature can
delegate the authority to create ballot restrictions, stating that "[t]he enumeration in the
Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained
by the people." U.S. CONST. amend. IX. That the Times, Places and Manner Clause
reserves the power to govern the manner of elections in state legislatures does not suggest
that a state's initiative process cannot reach ballot-access measures.
176. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. at 1854.
177. Id. Justice Thomas notes, however, that the Court has deemed positions taken by
Justice Story's commentaries to be more nationalist than the Constitution warrants. See
1 LIFE AND LETTERS OF JOSEPH STORY 296 (William W. Story ed., 1851) ("I hold it to
be a maxim... that the Government of the United States is intrinsically too weak, and
the powers of the State Governments too strong"). Compare 2 JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1067 (1891) (arguing
that the Commerce Clause deprives the states of the power to regulate any commerce
within Congress' reach) with Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 298 (1851)
(holding that Congress's Commerce Clause powers are not exclusive).
178. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. at 1878 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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before the Constitution was ratified.179 Electing representatives to
Congress is a right arising from the Constitution itself; the Tenth
Amendment cannot provide any basis for the proposition that states
possess reserved power to add qualifications to those enumerated in
the Qualifications Clauses. °80 Justice Stevens relies on the maxim
expressio unius exclusio alterius,181 concluding that "[i]n the absence
of any constitutional delegation to the States of power to add
qualifications to those enumerated in the Constitution, such a
[reserved] power does not exist." '
The majority finds support for its "original powers" view of
reserved powers in McCulloch v. Maryland1" and Powell v.
McCormack."s McCulloch questioned whether the State of Mary-
land could tax a bank chartered by Congress."'5 Chief Justice
Marshall presaged Justice Story's argument: "[A]n 'original right to
tax' such federal entities 'never existed, and the question whether it
has been surrendered, cannot arise.'"186 The Marshall Court
rejected Maryland's argument that constitutional silence regarding
state power to tax corporations chartered by Congress implies a
reserved power for states to tax federal instrumentalities.187
Justice Stevens also cites Powell v. McCormack to support the
majority's interpretation of the Qualifications Clauses." In
November 1966, Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. was elected to the United
179. Id. at 1855.
180. Id. at 1856.
181. Id. at 1850 n.9 ("[Tihe Framers' were well aware of the expressio unius argument
that would result from their wording of the Qualifications Clauses; they adopted that
wording nonetheless.").
182. Id. at 1856.
183. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819).
184. 395 U.S. 486 (1969). The majority also cites to the "impressive and uniform body
of judicial decisions and learned commentary" that supports its view that states lack the
power to add qualifications. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. at 1853.
185. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) at 326.
186. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. at 1854 (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat)
at 430).
187. Id. Justice Thomas, however, argues that the majority's characterization of the
holding in McCulloch is inaccurate. According to Thomas, the issue in McCulloch did not
turn on whether Maryland enjoyed the power to tax the bank before the framing; rather,
the majority's view of the holding in McCulloch renders "most of Chief Justice Marshall's
opinion irrelevant." Id. at 1880 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Marshall actually seemed to
assume the opposite-that the people "conferred on the general government the power
contained in the constitution, and on the States the whole residuum of power." Id. at 1879
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Marshall, C.J., McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) at 410).
188. Id. at 1847.
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States House of Representatives from the State of New York. 89
Powell faced accusations of serious misconduct, and a Select Commit-
tee found that he had wrongfully diverted House funds and falsely
reported foreign currency expenditures.19 The House of Represen-
tatives voted to exclude Powell from membership in Congress and
declared his seat vacant. 91 The Court found Powell's expulsion
unconstitutional because Article I, Section 2, Clause 2, sets forth the
exclusive qualifications for House membership." 2
Justice Stevens only relies on Powell for its detailed and thorough
review of the history and meaning of the Qualifications Clauses.93
Stevens admits that Powell does not control: "Our reaffirmation of
Powell, does not necessarily resolve the specific questions presented
in these cases."' 94 While Powell held that Congress may not impose
additional qualifications on its members, "the historical and textual
materials discussed in Powell do not support the conclusion that the
Constitution prohibits 'additional qualifications imposed by
States.'
'195
The majority advances a second, independent argument against
Amendment 73: Even if the states possess some original power in
this area, the Framers intended the Constitution to be the exclusive
source of qualifications for members of Congress, thereby "divesting"
the states of any power to add qualifications. 96 According to the
majority's interpretation of the Constitutional Convention and
ratification debates, "the Framers envisioned a uniform national
system.., creating a direct link between the National Government
189. Powell, 395 U.S. at 489.
190. Id. at 490.
191. Id. at 492-93.
192. Id. at 522 (holding that the House of Representatives has no "authority to exclude
any person, duly elected by his constituents, who meets all the requirements for
membership expressly prescribed in the Constitution").
193. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. at 1847-54.
194. Id. at 1852.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 1856. Justices Stevens and Thomas engage in intellectual hand-to-hand
combat over the issue of the Framers' intent. While both make well-reasoned arguments,
the historical record they are debating is too inconclusive to be dispositive. Professor
Sullivan writes that "the relevant text and history [of the Constitution] alone did not
clearly determine whether states may impose term limits. The majority and dissent battled
fiercely over text and history, but to a draw." Sullivan, supra note 6, at 80. Accordingly,
this Note will not review in detail either side's view of what the Framers actually thought
about state-imposed term limits.
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and the people of the United States."'" Justice Stevens argues that
the complete absence in the ratification debates of any assertion that
states have the power to add qualifications is proof that the Framers
intended to exclude action by the states in this area. t98  Stevens
supports this conclusion by citing Garcia for the proposition that,
while the states retain a significant measure of sovereign authority,
they do so "only to the extent that the Constitution has not divested
them of their original powers and transferred those powers to the
Federal Government." 199
D. Reasoning of the Dissent
Justice Thomas begins his dissent by noting the irony that "[t]he
majority... defends the right of the people of Arkansas to 'choose
whom they please to govern them' by invalidating a provision that
won nearly 60% of the votes cast in a direct election and that carried
every congressional district in the State."2' In a populist defense
of states' rights,2. ' Thomas argues that the people of the states need
not point to any affirmative constitutional grant of power to add
197. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. at 1855.
198. Id. at 1859. Not surprisingly, Justice Thomas construes this silence differently:
"To the extent that the records from the Philadelphia Convention itself shed light on this
case, they tend to hurt the majority's case." Id. at 1895 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
199. Id. at 1854 (quoting Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528,549
(1985)). Justice Thomas argues, however, that Garcia does not control because "[t]he
question raised by the present case... is not [as in Garcia] whether any principle of state
sovereignty implicit in the Tenth Amendment bars congressional action that Article I
appears to authorize, but rather whether Article I bars state action that it does not appear
to forbid." Id. at 1879 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
200. Id. at 1875 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Justice Stevens: "We noted [in
Powell] that allowing Congress to impose additional qualifications would violate that
'fundamental principle of our representative democracy... that the people should choose
whom they please to govern them.' ").
201. Professor John McGinnis notes that Justice Thomas's opinions are informed and
guided by an "originalist" approach to constitutional interpretation:
Justice Thomas emerged as the boldest member of the Court in half a
century-a jurist committed to seeking the original meaning of the Constitution
in lengthy and learned opinions that survey the vast scope of American consti-
tutional history.
In case after case where the original meaning of the Constitution was put
in issue ... Thomas wrote magisterial opinions that investigated the original
understanding of the Constitution in detail.
John 0. McGinnis, Original Thomas, Conventional Souter What Kind of Justices Should
the Next President Pick?, POL'Y REV., Fall 1995, at 24. For an interesting critique of
originalism, see Boris I. Bittker, Interpreting the Constitution: Is the Intent of the Framers
Controlling? If Not, What Is?, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 9 (1995).
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qualifications for representatives in Congress.2 2 On the contrary,
"[t]he Constitution is simply silent on this question. And where the
Constitution is silent, it raises no bar to action by the States or the
people. 20 3
Justice Thomas rejects the majority's "original powers" view and
embraces a "popular sovereignty" approach to Tenth Amendment
reserved powers. While he never actually coins this phrase to
describe this perspective, it is an appropriate label given his view that
"[t]he ultimate source of the Constitution's authority is the consent of
the people of each individual State"2' and that "[b]ecause the
people of the several States are the only true source of power... the
Federal Government enjoys no authority beyond what the Constitu-
tion confers."2 5 The majority does not reject the premise that the
Constitution derives its authority from the people. Indeed, the
majority notes that in Powell the Court "recognized the critical
postulate that sovereignty is vested in the people., 2 6 Differences
arise over conflicting interpretations of the Tenth Amendment's use
of the phrase "the people." Construing "the people" to mean "people
of the States"-as Justice Thomas does-the Tenth Amendment
reserves all nonenumerated power to the states. If "the people" are
"the undifferentiated people of the nation"-regardless of state
boundaries-the Tenth Amendment provides less support for
proponents of states' rights.
Rather than asking whether the power in question existed before
the ratification of the Constitution, Thomas contends that all power
stems from the people of the states and that "reserved" powers
therefore include all those not specifically granted to the federal
government in the Constitution? °' Accordingly, Thomas concludes
that the people of Arkansas enjoy reserved powers to limit the terms
of their representatives in Congress because the Qualification Clauses
merely recite minimum eligibility requirements? °'
202. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. at 1875 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
203. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
204. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
205. Id. at 1876 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
206. Id. at 1851.
207. Id. at 1876 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
208. Id. at 1885-87 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas therefore rejects the
majority's expressio unius formulation of the Qualifications Clauses.
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Justice Thomas reasons that the ultimate source of the Constitu-
tion's authority is the consent of the people of each individual
state.0 9 Further, "[b]ecause the people of the several States are the
only true source of power ... the Federal Government enjoys no
authority beyond what the Constitution confers: the Federal
Government's powers are limited and enumerated."2 ' The remain-
der of the people's powers not specifically granted to the federal
government through the Constitution is therefore either delegated to
state governments or retained by the people2 1 Constitutional
silence concerning a particular power means that the federal
government lacks that power and the states enjoy it.2"2 Thomas
argues that "[t]hese basic principles are enshrined in the Tenth
Amendment" and that all "powers reside at the state level except
where the Constitution removes them from that level." ' 3
While the Tenth Amendment does not specify whether "the
people" means the people of each state or the people of the nation
as a whole, Justice Thomas argues that the latter interpretation would
render the Amendment pointless. 2 4 "[I]t would make no sense to
speak of powers as being reserved to the undifferentiated people of
the Nation as a whole, because the Constitution does not contemplate
that those people will either exercise power or delegate it."2 5
Every mechanism for action provided by the Constitution tracks state
boundaries. For example, amendments are ratified by conventions of
the people in each state, not by a national convention;216 members
209. Id. at 1876 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
210. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas quotes the late Justice Black as saying
that "[t]he United States is entirely a creature of the Constitution. Its power and authority
have no other source." Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1,
5-6 (1957)).
211. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). Which. reserved powers are delegated to state
governments and which reserved powers are retained by the people directly? The
Constitution does not deal with this issue-Thomas notes that "it is up to the various state
constitutions to declare which powers the people of each State have delegated to their
state government." Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). The Tenth Amendment artfully avoids
taking a position on the "division of power" among the people and their various state
governments. Powers "are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S.
CONST. amend. X. The people thus decide which reserved powers to delegate to their
state governments.
212. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. at 1876 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
213. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
214. Id. at 1876-77 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
215. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
216. U.S. CONST. art. V.
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of Congress are chosen state by state, not by nationwide elections;217
the President is selected by an electoral college comprised of
delegates chosen by the states, not by nationwide election. Further-
more, the structure of the Constitution itself supports the interpreta-
tion that the Tenth Amendment's use of the phrase "the people"
actually refers to "the people of the States." The Constitution
provides that the United States Congress shall enjoy "[a]ll legislative
Powers herein granted."' 8 The Constitution specifically enumerates
the powers of Congress 9 and prevents the states from exercising
certain powers.' 0 Thus, "[tihe import of this structure is the same
as the import of the Tenth Amendment., 21 Powers not specifically
granted to the federal government or prohibited to the states are
reserved to the people of the states. "In short, the notion of popular
sovereignty that undergirds the Constitution does not erase state
boundaries, but rather tracks them."'
Justice Thomas attacks the majority's "original powers" model of
reserved powers as untenable and incoherent.' According to the
majority, since the Tenth Amendment can only "reserve" to the states
powers that existed before the Constitution, the people of Arkansas
cannot exercise any power over the terms of their representatives in
Congress because the states did not enjoy any powers over the
selection of Congress prior to the ratification of the Constitution.24
Again, the majority holds that the States cannot "reserve" powers that
they did not control at the time of the Framing.' Justice Thomas
disagrees:
217. Id. art. I, § 2, c1. 1 (stating that "[t]he House of Representatives shall be composed
of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States"); id. art. I, § 3,
cl. 1 (stating that "[t]he Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators
from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof").
218. Id. art. I, § 1 (emphasis added).
219. Id. art. I, § 8.
220. Id. art. I, § 10.
221. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. at 1877 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
222. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas's position that the Constitution
derives its authority from the people of each state is consistent with Madison's views as
expressed in The Federalist- The Constitution was "founded on the assent and ratification
of the people of America ... not as individuals composing one entire nation, but as
composing the distinct and independent States to which they respectively belong." THE
FEDERALIST No. 39, at 254 (James Madison) (Carl Van Doren ed., 1973).
223. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. at 1877-78 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
224. Id. at 1878 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
225. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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But it was not the state governments that were doing the
reserving. The Constitution derives its authority instead
from the consent of the people of the States. Given [this]
fundamental principle... it would simply be incoherent to
assert that the people of the States could not reserve any
powers that they had not previously controlled."2 6
The use of the word "reserved" in the Tenth Amendment also does
not support the majority's interpretation:
If someone says that the power to use a particular facility is
reserved to some group, he is not saying anything about
whether that group has previously used the facility. He is
merely saying that the people who control the facility have
designated that group as the entity with authority to use
it.
227
Justice Thomas concludes that the majority errs in finding that the
people of the states cannot authorize their state governments to
exercise any powers that were unknown to the states at the time of
the Framing.'
Justice Thomas also takes issue with the majority's view that
Amendment 73 conflicts with "national sovereignty." 29  The
majority cites Justice Story in support of its view that it would be
incongruous for the states or the people of the states to have any
reserved powers over the selection of members of Congress."
Justice Stevens contends that since Congress is a national institution
and its members "owe primary allegiance not to the people of a State,
but to the people of the Nation,"21 allowing individual states to
226. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
227. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
228. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). Indeed, the majority's view of reserved powers
frustrates the purpose of the Tenth Amendment's final phrase, "to the people." Thomas
argues that the Tenth Amendment does not preempt any limitations on state power found
in the state constitutions. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). Had the Tenth Amendment been
written to exclude this final phrase-the powers not delegated to the federal government
are simply reserved to the states-it could have been construed as eliminating the power
of the people to amend their state constitutions to remove limitations that were in effect
when the Constitution and Bill of Rights were ratified. Ia (Thomas, J., dissenting).
229. Id. at 1881 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
230. Id. at 1853.
231. Id. at 1855.
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limit the terms of their representatives in Congress is inconsistent with
the Framers' vision of a national government. 2 Justice Thomas
argues, however, that "the selection of representatives in Congress is
indisputably an act of the people of each State, not some abstract
people of the Nation as a whole." 3  The Constitution does not
create any means at all, such as a national initiative, for action by the
people of the nation as a whole.' Since the Constitution has left
the election of Members of Congress entirely to the people of the
states or their state legislatures, the people of each State have
retained their "independent political identity" when it comes to
choosing their federal representatives."5 "As a result, there is
absolutely nothing strange about the notion that the people of the
States or their state legislatures possess 'reserved' powers in this
area."
36
232. Id. The majority also cites the provision of the Constitution setting compensation
for members of Congress in support of its idea that federal officials owe their allegiance
to the people and not to states. Id. Article I, Section 6, Clause 1, of the Constitution
provides that federal legislators "shall receive a Compensation for their Services, to be
ascertained by Law, and paid out of the Treasury of the United States." The majority
reasons that since the federal government pays their salaries, Members of Congress owe
their primary loyalty to the federal government. Id. at 1882 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Justice Thomas disagrees: "[T]he fact that Members of Congress draw a federal
salary once they have assembled hardly means that the people of the States lack reserved
powers over the selection of their representatives." Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). Indeed,
Thomas points out that historical evidence regarding the compensation provision suggests
that the reserved powers of the states extend beyond the mere selection stage. Id.
(Thomas, J., dissenting). James Madison "specifically indicated that even with the
compensation provision in place, the individual States still enjoyed the reserved power to
supplement the federal salary." Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (citing
Madison's remarks at the Virginia ratifying convention).
233. Id. at 1881 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("When the people of Georgia pick their
representatives in Congress, they are acting as the people of Georgia, not as the corporate
agents for the undifferentiated people of the Nation as a whole.").
234. Id. at 1882 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
235. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
236. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). The majority also argues that the people of Arkansas
do not enjoy reserved powers over the selection of their members of Congress because the
Constitution expressly delegates power to the states concerning federal elections. Id. at
1855 ("[The provisions governing elections reveal the Framers' understanding that powers
over the election of federal officers had to be delegated to, rather than reserved by, the
States."). Justice Thomas, however, contends that the "Times, Places and Manner" clause
does not delegate any authority to the states and simply imposes a duty upon them to
guarantee the continued existence of Congress. Id. at 1883 (Thomas, J., dissenting). This
duty to preserve the Union by continuing to elect federal representatives is consistent with
the notion of reserved powers. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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Justice Thomas also disagrees with the majority's characterization
of McCulloch v. Maryland. 7  Thomas admits that McCulloch
specifies that "a power need not be 'expressly' delegated to the
United States or prohibited to the States in order to fall outside the
Tenth Amendment's reservation; delegations and prohibitions can also
arise by necessary implication.""8  However, McCulloch is true to
the text of the Tenth Amendment; it holds that all powers to which
the Constitution does not speak are reserved to the state level.239
Justice Thomas also notes that McCulloch does not qualify its holding
on whether the states had enjoyed the power to tax federal instrumen-
talities before the framing. On the contrary, McCulloch assumes that
the people of the states "conferred on the general government the
power contained in the [C]onstitution, and on the States the whole
residuum of power."2' Thomas chides the majority for misreading
the holding of McCulloch. "For the majority ... McCulloch appar-
ently turned on the fact that before the Constitution was adopted, the
States had possessed no power to tax ... institutions that the
Constitution created."241  The majority's view of the holding in
McCulloch is untenable because it renders the balance of Chief
Justice Marshall's opinion irrelevant.2
The majority also relies on the Court's analysis in Powell v.
McCormick43 to support its interpretation of the Qualifications
Clauses.2' Although Powell did not address the specific questions
presented in Thornton,24 the Court in Powell concluded that
237. Id. at 1879 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
238. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). Thomas fails to define the circumstances which would
justify a finding of federal power based on "necessary implication." This ambiguity in his
model of reserved powers poses a serious problem. If congressional authority can be
"necessarily implied" from an Article I power, such as the Commerce Clause or the
Spending Clause, then the Tenth Amendment becomes meaningless and Thomas's model
an exercise in circular reasoning. Absent a clear definition of "necessary implication,"
Thomas's model fails to resolve the biggest challenge facing Tenth Amendment
proponents: how to evade the Commerce Clause's broad, independent grant of power to
Congress. Part IV of this Note addresses this issue in more detail. See infra part IV.D.
239. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. at 1879 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
240. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
316, 410 (1819)).
241. Id. at 1880 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
242. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("[A]ccording to the majority, there was no need to
inquire into whether federal law deprived Maryland of the power in question, because the
power could not fall into the category of 'reserved' powers anyway.").
243. 95 U.S. 486 (1969).
244. Thornton, 115 S.Ct. at 1847-50.
245. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
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Congress has no power to prescribe qualifications for its own
members.24 6 Justice Thomas agrees with the holding in Powell, but
contends that the majority is wrong in concluding that Powell
somehow stands for the proposition that "the Qualifications Clauses
contain a hidden exclusivity provision."'247
Justice Thomas reasons that Congress cannot add qualifications
because nothing in the Constitution grants Congress this power.24
Powell addressed the issue of whether the power granted to each
House of Congress in Article I, Section 5249 of the Constitution
includes the power to add extra qualifications beyond those that are
set forth in the Qualifications Clauses. 0 Contrary to the majority's
characterization, "the critical question in Powell was whether [Section
5] conferred a qualification-setting power-not whether the Qualifica-
tions Clauses took it away."" 1  Thus, Justice Thomas concludes that
the "fact that the Framers did not grant a qualification-setting power
to Congress does not imply that they wanted to bar its exercise at the
state level." 2
Justice Thomas also distinguishes the majority's use of Garcia v.
San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority.3 According to the
majority, the complete absence of any assertion that states have the
power to add qualifications in the ratification debates proves the
Framers' intent to exclude state action in this area." Citing Garcia,
the majority argues that although the states retain a significant
measure of sovereign authority, they do so only to the extent that the
Constitution has not divested them of their original powers and
246. Powell, 395 U.S. at 550.
247. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. at 1889 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
248. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
249. "Each House [of Congress] shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and
Qualifications of its Own Members." U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 5.
250. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. at 1889 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
251. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("[D]eciding whether the Constitution denies the
qualification-setting power to the States and the people of the States requires a
fundamentally different legal analysis" rather than whether Article I, Section 5, grants a
qualification-setting power to Congress.).
252. Id. at 1890 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Thomas points out that the Framers decided
not to let Congress prescribe the qualifications of its own members because "members of
Congress would have an obvious conflict of interest if they could determine who may run
against them." Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). However, neither the state legislatures nor
the people of the states "would labor under the same conflict of interest when prescribing
qualifications" for their representatives in Congress. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
253. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
254. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. at 1871.
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transferred those powers to the federal government.255 However,
Thomas contends that Garcia does not control. "The question raised
by the present case... is not [as in Garcia] whether any principle of
state sovereignty implicit in the Tenth Amendment bars congressional
action that Article I appears to authorize, but rather whether Article
I bars state action that it does not appear to forbid." 6
Justice Thomas also notes that the Court's decision may have
some unintended consequences. "Today's decision also means that no
State may disqualify congressional candidates whom a court has found
to be mentally incompetent ... who are currently in prison ... or
who have past vote fraud convictions."" Whereas states require
that all candidates be qualified to vote, 8 the Court's decision leaves
open the possibility that the people of each state may trust someone
with "their vote in Congress even though they do not trust him with
a vote in the election for Congress."' 9
IV. THOMAS'S POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY MODEL OF RESERVED
POWERS
Justice Thomas contends, as a matter of first principle, that the
people of each state, not the people of the nation as a whole,
adopted the Constitution.2" The people of the states are thus
prohibited from acting "only if they impose such a prohibition on
themselves in the Constitution or cede[sic] such power exclusively to
the federal government., 26  Accordingly, "[o]nce it is established
that the federal government is a government of enumerated powers
while the state governments are governments of residual powers, the
term-limits case is easily decided.,
262
255. Id. at 1854.
256. Id. at 1879 (Thomas., J., dissenting).
257. Id. at 1909 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
258. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 17-14-1.2 (1988) (restricting candidacy to people
"qualified to vote").
259. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. at 1909 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
260. Id. at 1875 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
261. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
262. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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A. Thomas's Cornerstone: The Doctrine of
Enumerated Powers63
The Tenth Amendment fails to identify among powers delegated
to the federal government, prohibited to the states, or reserved to the
states or to the people.26 Thomas's popular sovereignty model of
reserved powers must therefore necessarily be read in light of the
doctrine of enumerated powers.
The doctrine of enumerated powers is explicit in the very first
sentence of Article I of the Constitution: "All legislative Powers
herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United
States. '' 26' This sentence assumes the obvious: If the Constitution
does not grant Congress a power, Congress simply does not possess
that power. As Roger Pilon of the Cato Institute has written:
Plainly, power resides in the first instance in the people, who
then grant or delegate their power, reserve it, or prohibit its
exercise, not immediately through periodic elections but
rather institutionally-through the Constitution. The
importance of that starting point cannot be overstated, for
it is the foundation of whatever legitimacy our system of
266government can claim.
Put in this context, the Tenth Amendment represents a broad
expression of the Framers' intent to limit the federal government to
specific, enumerated powers:
As the final member of the Bill of Rights, and the culmina-
tion of the founding period, the Tenth Amendment recapitu-
lates the philosophy of government first set forth in the
Declaration of Independence, that governments are institut-
ed to secure our rights, that they derive their just powers
from the consent of the governed.2 67
The doctrine of enumerated powers "gives content to the Tenth
Amendment"'2 and serves as the cornerstone of Thomas's popular
263. For an excellent analysis of the relationship between the Tenth Amendment and
the enumerated powers doctrine, see CATO INST., THE CATO HANDBOOK FOR CONGRESS
17-34 (1995).
264. See supra note 228.
265. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (emphasis added).
266. Roger Pilon, On the First Principles of Federalism, CATO POL'Y REP., Nov./Dec.
1995, at 1, 10 (emphasis omitted).
267. Id. (emphasis omitted).
268. Id.
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sovereignty model of reserved powers. Because the scope of federal
power is limited to those powers enumerated in the Constitution,
"where the Constitution is silent, it raises no bar to action by the
States or the people."2 69  The doctrine of enumerated powers
informs and guides Thomas's approach to reserved powers under the
Tenth Amendment:
[I]f a power has not been delegated to the federal govern-
ment, that government simply does not have it. In that case,
as Justice Thomas correctly said in his trenchant dissent in
[Thornton], it becomes a question of state law whether the
power is held by a state or, failing that, by the people,
having never been granted to either government.70
B. Thornton: A Case of First Impression
Thornton is also the first modern Tenth Amendment case that
does not directly implicate the Commerce Clause or some other
Article I power of Congress. While National League of Cities, Garcia,
and New York v. United States addressed whether the Tenth Amend-
ment bars congressional action the Constitution appears to authorize,
the issue in Thornton concerns the Constitution barring state action
that it does not appear to forbid.271
Each of the previous three cases involved challenges to otherwise
constitutional federal laws and each used the Tenth Amendment as
a "sword" to curtail the scope of federal power.272 In National
League of Cities the Court held that the wage and overtime provisions
of the Fair Labor Standards Act as applied to state and local
government employees violated the Tenth Amendment.273 The
Court never questioned, however, whether Congress-had the power
under the Commerce Clause to enact the legislation in the first place.
The Tenth Amendment simply provided an affirmative check on an
otherwise valid exercise of congressional power. "[T]here are
attributes of sovereignty attaching to every state government which
may not be impaired by Congress, not because Congress may lack an
affirmative grant of legislative authority to reach the matter, but
269. United States Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842,1875 (1995) (Thomas,
J., dissenting).
270. Pilon, supra note 266, at 10.
271. See supra part IV.B.
272. See supra notes 88-110 and accompanying text.
273. National League of Cities v. FCC, 426 U.S. 833, 845 (1976).
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because the Constitution prohibits it from exercising the authority in
that manner."'274
Like National League of Cities, Garcia involved "the extent to
which principles of state sovereignty implicit in our federal system
curtail Congress's authority to exercise its enumerated powers."275
Although the Garcia Court overruled National League of Cities, the
issue of applying the Fair Labor Standards Act to state and local
government employees was the same.276 Similarly, New York v.
United States addressed whether the federal government could compel
the states to enact or administer an otherwise constitutional federal
regulatory program," not whether Congress had the power to enact
a regulatory program to dispose of radioactive waste.
Thornton, however, does not involve the extent to which
principles of state sovereignty limit Congress's authority to exercise
its enumerated powers. The reserved powers of the State of
Arkansas, not the enumerated powers of Congress, are at issue in
Thornton. The Arkansas term limit law raises the question of
"whether [the Constitution] bars state action that it does not appear
to forbid.""27 According to Justice Thomas, the answer appears in
the Tenth Amendment: "[U]nless the Federal Constitution affirma-
tively prohibits an action by the States or the people, it raises no bar
to such action."279
Thornton appears to be a case of first impression in modern
Tenth Amendment jurisprudence. Justice Thomas's model of
reserved powers could have broad implications for federalism if
adopted by a future majority. Under the Thomas approach, whenever
a state enacts legislation in an area of constitutional silence, the
Constitution will not proscribe the state's action."0 Justice Thom-
as's model, if applied in conjunction with decisions like New York,
could conceivably create a very large zone of reserved activity for the
states. For example, the Constitution is silent on the issue of doctor-
274. Id.
275. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842, 1878 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
276. See supra notes 96-101.
277. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 154 (1992).
278. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. at 1879 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
279. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
280. See iL at 1875-84 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The states, of course, must yield to
federal law where the Congress preempts the field pursuant to a valid exercise of its
enumerated powers.
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assisted suicide. There is no enumerated grant of power to Congress
in this area."' Because the Constitution is silent, the states and the
people of the states are free to exercise their reserved powers in this
area.
C. The "Federalism Coalition"
Thornton can be "read as a preview of the Court's response to
other coming controversies over the relative reach of state and federal
power."' The formalist approaches adopted by both the majority
and the dissent appear to be aimed at "locking in default rules to
govern future federalism disputes." 3 The Supreme Court split in
Thornton into two, four-Justice camps, with Justice Kennedy
occupying the middle ground."
As discussed in Part II, for sixty years the Supreme Court refused
to check Congress's exercise of its commerce power and refused to
acknowledge that the Tenth Amendment provided any affirmative
check on federal power. 5 New York and Lopez may have signaled
a change in course, however. The Court now appears willing to limit
the reach of federal power in certain circumstances. 6 The dissent
in Thornton is therefore best understood in the context of New York
and Lopez as part of an overall effort by the Court's "federalism
coalition" to limit federal power.
A review of the voting patterns in Garcia, New York, Lopez, and
Thornton reveals the existence of a distinct four-Justice "federalism
coalition."' Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia,
and Thomas have consistently voted to limit federal power through
a more expansive reading of the Tenth Amendment and a narrower
281. One could argue that Congress has the power to act in this area under an
extremely attenuated reading of the Commerce Clause. Doctor-assisted suicides may
"affect" interstate commerce by impacting federal Medicare reimbursements to hospitals
that allow their facilities to be used in this manner.
282. Sullivan, supra note 6, at 81.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 97.
285. See supra part I.B.3-4.
286. Id.
287. For purposes of this Note, the dissenting opinions in Thornton and Garcia, and the
majority opinions in New York and Lopez, are representative of a pro-federalism
philosophy.
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reading of the Commerce Clause.2" Each of these Justices has a
100% "federalism rating.
28 9
Three Justices have a zero percent federalism rating: Justices
Stevens, Breyer, and Ginsburg."9 These thiee appear to form a
recognizable pro-federal bloc. Whenever a case presents an opportu-
nity to limit federal power, this group has consistently voted to uphold
federal power. Justice Kennedy, with a 66% rating,291 and Justice
Souter, with a 33% rating,2 have provided the "swing votes" in
federalism cases. Recently, however, Justice Souter appears to have
cast his lot with the federal camp-he dissented in Lopez and joined
the majority in Thornton.93 Thus, any continuing trend by the
Court to limit federal power hinges on the federalism coalition's
ability to persuade Justice Kennedy to vote with them.
Proponents of Tenth Amendment federalism have reason to be
optimistic that Justice Kennedy may return to the fold in future cases.
Although the federalism coalition was unsuccessful in winning
Kennedy's vote in Thornton, they assembled a five-vote majority with
Kennedy's help in both Lopez and New York. In his concurring
opinion in Thornton, Justice Kennedy actually embraces the principles
of federalism embodied in the Tenth Amendment:
288. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor dissented in Garcia and Thornton
and voted with the majority in New York and Lopez. Justices Scalia and Thomas also
dissented in Thornton and voted with the majority in New York and Lopez. See supra
notes 89-110 and accompanying text.
289. Assuming that these four cases represent benchmark cases in modem federalism
jurisprudence, a Justice's "federalism rating" is a function of how often a particular Justice
voted to limit federal power. For example, Chief Justice Rehnquist has voted consistently
in all four cases to limit federal power. The Chief Justice's four-for-four record yields a
100% rating.
290. Justice Stevens dissented in Lopez and New York, and voted with the majority in
Garcia and Thornton. Justices Breyer and Ginsburg dissented in Lopez and voted with
the majority in Thornton.
291. Justice Kennedy voted with the federalism coalition in New York and Lopez but
defected to the other side in Thornton.
292. Justice Souter only voted with the federalism coalition on one occasion, in New
York.
293. The two camps are best discerned by juxtaposing Thornton with Lopez. The four
Justices who joined the majority in Thornton but dissented in Lopez appeared "willing to
strike down a state encroachment upon the federal government, but not a federal
enroachment upon the states." Sullivan, supra note 6, at 103. The four Justices who
dissented in Thornton but joined the majority in Lopez-the federalism coali-
tion--"favored the opposite one-way ratchet, invalidating a federal encroachment upon the
states but not a state encroachment upon the federal government." Id.
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Federalism was our Nation's own discovery. The Framers
split the atom of sovereignty. It was the genius of their idea
that our citizens would have two political capacities, one
state and one federal, each protected from incursion by the
other. The resulting Constitution created a legal system
unprecedented in form and design, establishing two orders
of government, each with its own direct relationship, its own
privity, its own set of mutual rights and obligations to the
people who sustain it and are governed by it.2'
Indeed, Justice Kennedy argues that his vote to invalidate the
Arkansas term limit statute is actually consistent with his previous
support of the federalism coalition in New York and Lopez: "That
the States may not invade the sphere of federal sovereignty is as
uncontestable, in my view, as the corollary proposition that the
Federal Government must be held within the boundaries of its own
power when it intrudes upon matters reserved to the States."'295
Unfortunately for the federalism coalition, Kennedy adopts the
view that qualifications for members of Congress fall within the
"sphere of federal sovereignty."296 However, given Justice Kenne-
dy's apparent predisposition toward limiting federal power,2" it
appears that the federalism coalition has a reasonable chance of
building future five-vote majorities in support of its pro-states agenda.
D. The Problem with the Commerce Clause: Does Lopez Clear
the Way?
Justice Thomas writes that "where the Constitution is silent about
the exercise of a particular power-that is, where the Constitution
does not speak either expressly or by necessary implication-the
Federal Government lacks that power and the States enjoy it."29
Justice Thomas's ambiguous reference to federal powers "by
necessary implication" poses a serious problem. If congressional
authority can be "necessarily implied" from an Article I power such
as the Commerce Clause, then the Tenth Amendment becomes
294. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842, 1872 (1995) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
295. Id. at 1873 (Kennedy J., concurring). Justice Kennedy cites Lopez in support of
this proposition.
296. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
297. See supra notes 291-95 and accompanying text.
298. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. at 1876 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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meaningless and Justice Thomas's model an exercise in circular
reasoning. Absent a clear definition of what "by necessary implica-
tion" means, Thomas's approach fails to resolve the biggest challenge
facing Tenth Amendment proponents-how to get around the
Commerce Clause's broad, independent grant of power to Con-
gress.299
The Supreme Court's stunning decision in Lopez appears to have
cleared the way for a narrower reading of the Commerce Clause,
creating an opening for the jurisprudential revival of the Tenth
Amendment through Justice Thomas's model of reserved powers.
Until Lopez, the modem Court never declared a single federal law
unconstitutional as exceeding the scope of congressional power under
the Commerce Clause, choosing instead to adopt a very deferential
"rational basis" test in regard to federal commerce power.3" For
almost sixty years, Congress had broad authority to legislate pursuant
to the Commerce Clause. "So long as Congress [did] not violate
another constitutional provision ... legislation adopted under the
commerce clause would be upheld because almost any activity has
some reasonable relationship to interstate commerce."301
In a 5-4 decision, the Court struck down the Gun-Free School
Zones Act of 19 9002 which made it a federal crime to possess a
firearm within 1,000 feet of a school.3 Writing for the majority,
Chief Justice Rehnquist identified three types of activities that
Congress can regulate under its commerce power: channels of
interstate commerce,3° instrumentalities of interstate commerce,0 5
and activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. 30 6 The
Court held that "the proper test requires an analysis of whether the
299. See supra note 10.
300. See, e.g., Presault v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 494 U.S. 1, 17 (1990); Hodel
v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 276 (1981); Maryland v.
Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 190 (1968).
301. Erwin Chemerinsky, Lopez: A Major New Limit on Congressional Powers, CRIM.
L. NEws, Summer 1995, at 1, 1 [hereinafter A Major New Limit].
302. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) (1994).
303. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
304. Id. at 1629. Rehnquist cites to Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379
U.S. 241 (1964), which upheld the federal law prohibiting discrimination by hotels and
restaurants as an example of protecting interstate commerce channels. Lopez, 115 S. Ct.
at 1629.
305. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629. The Chief Justice cites to several cases upholding
Congress's power to regulate the railroads as examples of regulating the instrumentalities
of interstate commerce. See Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 342 (1914).
306. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630.
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regulated activity 'substantially affects' interstate commerce. '" 3 7 The
Court concluded that the presence of a gun near a school did not
substantially affect interstate commerce and that its relationship to
interstate commerce was too attenuated and tangential to uphold the
law as a valid exercise of congressional commerce power.3 8
The impact of Lopez and the extent to which it will curtail
federal power remains to be seen.3 9 The majority opinion in Lopez
presents Tenth Amendment advocates with a rather unsatisfying
resolution to the commerce power problem. The majority "did little
to explain what the 'substantial affects' interstate commerce test
means" and failed to articulate criteria to be used by lower courts or
the Supreme Court in the future.3t0 Lopez runs the risk of becom-
ing another National League of Cities, generating sufficient confusion
and uncertainty to drive Justice "swing vote" Kennedy out of the
federalism coalition.3 '
The majority's rationale for striking down the statute was at most
a minor departure from existing precedent.31a While the majority
created an exception to Congress's commerce power for intrastate
activity that is not of a commercial nature,313 the Court ignored the
"rational basis test" without discarding it explicitly.34 In dicta, the
Court reaffirmed the traditional test, inquiring whether Congress has
a rational basis for concluding that the activity, in the aggregate, has
a substantial affect on interstate commerce.315 Although the Court
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. See supra part IV.D.
310. A Major New Limit, supra note 301, at 2.
311. See supra notes 89-101 and accompanying text. It was Justice Blackmun-the
shaky "swing vote" in National League of Cities-who eventually switched sides nine years
later and wrote the new majority opinion in Garcia expressly overruling National League
of Cities.
312. James E. Gauch, Supreme Court Highlights, THE FEDERALIST PAPER, Aug. 1995,
at 7, 9.
313. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630. Acknowledging the Court's past lenient review under
the rational basis test, the Chief Justice nevertheless points out that the previous cases all
involved statutes that regulated "economic activity." Id. The Chief Justice does not take
issue with the "great deference" the Court has shown to Congress in previous cases
involving commercial activities. Gauch, supra note 312, at 10 (quoting Lopez, 115 S. Ct.
at 1634).
314. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630.
315. Gauch, supra note 312, at 9 ("Only Justice Thomas, in a lone concurrence,
questioned the substantial effects test or rational basis scrutiny.").
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"took a step toward restoring limits to Congress's commerce powers,
it was a small and hesitant step.
3 16
Footnote four of the majority's opinion does not appear to
preclude the possibility that in the future the Court could uphold a
new version of the statute if supported by congressional findings
documenting the interstate commerce nexus.3 17  The majority
implicitly reserves whether congressional findings could have saved
the Gun-Free School Zones Act.3 18 Given that the majority has
reiterated the need for appropriate deference to Congress,
319
consider the dilemma that the Court would face if Congress reenacts
the statute with the types of findings referenced in footnote four. To
be consistent, the Court would have to strike down the statute
regardless of the findings because the connection between possession
of guns near schools and interstate commerce is too tangential and
uncertain under the "substantial affects" test. However, by defering
to the findings and upholding the new statute, as it certainly could
under footnote four, the Court looks as though it were making
Congress "jump through the hoops" of providing specific findings to
support its exercise of commerce power." Neither approach seems
particularly deferential to Congress, and both approaches support the
charge that the Court would be engaged in judicial policymaking.
While proponents of Justice Thomas's Tenth Amendment model
of reserved powers can take heart in the Court's retreat from its
expansive reading of the Commerce Clause, it remains to be seen
whether Lopez marks the beginning of a long-term trend toward
restoring limits to Congress's commerce powers. "Depending on how
aggressively the Supreme Court applies its holding in Lopez, literally
hundreds of federal laws might be constitutionally vulnerable."3 '
If, however, the substantial affects standard in Lopez proves to be too
difficult to administer or creates too much confusion in the lower
316. Id. at 10.
317. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1632 n.4.
318. See Tung Yin, United States v. Lopez: An Unsatisfying Resolution at 2, (1995)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
319. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1634.
320. Yin, supra note 318, at 23.
321. A Major New Limit, supra note 301, at 1. For an example of how Lopez is already
having an impact on federal criminal law, see United States v. Pappadopoulos, 64 F.3d 522
(9th Cir. 1995) (where proof that a private residence received natural gas from out-of-state
sources was not enough to demonstrate a "substantial effect" on interstate commerce
required by the jurisdictional element of the federal arson statute, 18 U.S.C. § 844(i)
(1994)).
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courts, Lopez may well turn out to be another National League of
Cities-a trailblazing opinion rendered meaningless by its own internal
contradictions and ambiguities. This result would be most unfortu-
nate because future acceptance of Justice Thomas's popular sovereign-
ty model of reserved powers depends on a narrower reading of the
Commerce Clause.
V. THE BRADY HANDGUN CONTROL ACT: APPLYING THE
POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY MODEL
Justice Thomas's popular sovereignty model of Tenth Amend-
ment reserved powers would give the states much greater latitude to
act absent specific constitutional preemption.3' This new and
expansive approach to Tenth Amendment jurisprudence, if adopted
by a future majority, would call into question many federal laws,
potentially returning significant portions of federal power to the
states.
An example of one such law is the Brady Handgun Control
Act.3" While the Brady Act has been the subject of repeated
challenges since its passage in 1993,324 the Ninth Circuit has upheld
the Act on the grounds that it does not violate the Tenth Amendment
as interpreted by United States v. New York.3' The following
discussion reviews these New York-based Tenth Amendment
challenges to the Act and then shows how the application of Justice
Thomas's popular sovereignty model would result in the Act being
found unconstitutional.
A. History and Provisions of the Brady Act
In March 1981, John Hinckley, Jr. attempted to kill President
Ronald Reagan in a deluded effort to impress actress Jodie Fos-
322. See supra part IV.
323. 18 U.S.C. § 922(s) (1994). State and local officials in Illinois and California also
have challenged the National Voter Registration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg (Supp. V 1993),
popularly known as the "motor-voter" law, claiming that the law requires the states to
enforce federal programs in violation of structural principles of state autonomy. Two
federal courts have rejected their Tenth Amendment state autonomy claim, upholding the
motor-voter law as constitutional. See Voting Rights Coalition v. Wilson, 60 F.3d 1411
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, - S. Ct. -, 64 USLW 3498 (1995); Association of Community
Orgs. for Reform Now v. Edgar, 56 F.3d 791 (7th Cir. 1995).
324. See infra notes 342-43 and accompanying text.
325. Mack v. United States, 66 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 1995).
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ter.326 While President Reagan fully recovered from the attack, his
press secretary, James Brady, was not so lucky. During the assassina-
tion attempt, the first of six bullets fired from Hinckley's gun entered
Brady's skull. 327 Although Brady beat ten-to-one odds by surviving
surgery, the bullet left Brady partially paralyzed.3" Many were
outraged when it became known that, despite a history of mental
instability, Hinckley had easily purchased a .22-caliber handgun for
only $29.00 from a Texas pawnshop.
329
As a result of the assassination attempt, James Brady's wife,
Sarah, became "a visible leader in the effort to strengthen America's
gun control laws and prevent criminals and mentally unstable people
from obtaining handguns., 331 In 1984, Sarah Brady joined Handgun
Control, Inc., becoming its national chairperson in 1990.331 Brady
and other gun control proponents aggressively lobbied Congress to
pass federal legislation requiring all handgun purchasers to submit to
background checks and a mandatory waiting period.332 Although
the so-called "Brady Bill" was first introduced in Congress in 1987, its
passage was blocked for seven years due to intense resistance from
gun owner organizations like the National Rifle Association.333
However, with the election of a Democratic President in 1992, gun
control proponents finally gained the upper hand. On November 30,
1993, President Bill Clinton signed the Brady Handgun Violence
Protection Act into law.
31
326. Ron Shaffer & Neil Henry, Hinckley Pursued Actress for Months, Letter Shows,
WASH. POST, Apr. 2, 1981, at Al; see Dyan Finguerra, Note, The Tenth Amendment
Shoots Down the Brady Act, 3 J.L. & PoL'Y 637 (1995).
327. Finguerra, supra note 326, at 637 (citing David S. Broder, Jim and Sarah Brady.
A Thumbs-Up Couple, DET. FREE PRESS, Nov. 9, 1987, at 11A).
328. Id.
329. David Behrens, Ten Years of Survival, NEWSDAY, Mar. 5, 1991, at 48. Indeed, at
the time of the shooting, Hinckley was under psychiatric care and was taking Valium.
Finguerra, supra note 326, at 637 n.4.
330. Finguerra, supra note 326, at 638.
331. Id. at 639 n.7.
332. Id. at 639.
333. Id. For a more detailed account of the debate surrounding the Brady Bill, see Bob
Dole, The Brady Bill: It's Just Not Enough, 3 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 135 (1993/1994);
Andrew Jay McClurg, The Rhetoric of Gun Control, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 53 (1992).
334. Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536 (1993) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(s) (1994)).
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Passed as an amendment to the Gun Control Act of 1968,3' 5 the
Brady Act imposes a waiting period of up to five days for the
purchase of a handgun and subjects purchasers to a background check
during that period.336 The background checks must be performed
by the Chief Law Enforcement Officer (CLEO) of the prospective
purchaser's place of residence.337 The Act requires CLEOs to
"make a reasonable effort to ascertain ... whether receipt or
possession [of a handgun] would be in violation of the law., 338 If
the CLEO approves the transfer, he or she must destroy the buyer's
sworn statement within twenty days after the statement was made.339
If the CLEO disapproves of the transfer, the CLEO must provide the
reasons for the disapproval within twenty business days if so request-
ed by the disappointed buyer."4 The Act does not require Congress
to appropriate funds to the states to administer this program."
B. Tenth Amendment Challenges to the Brady Act
A series of Tenth Amendment challenges to the Brady Act have
experienced some success in federal court. Five of six district court
cases have held all or part of the Act unconstitutional. 2  Gun
owner groups suffered a defeat, however, when a three-judge panel
on the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit conclud-
ed that the Act was constitutional.'3 Despite this setback, Mack v.
335. The original Gun Control Act only required a purchaser to swear on a federal
form that he or she was mentally stable and not a fugitive.
336. 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(2) (1994).
337. Id. Within five years from the effective date of the Act, such checks are to be
performed instantaneously through a national criminal background check system
maintained by the Department of Justice. Id. § 922(t) (1994).
338. Id. § 922(s)(2) (1994).
339. Id. § 922(s)(6)(B)(i) (1994).
340. Id. § 922(s)(6)(C) (1994).
341. See id. § 922(s) (1994).
342. Romero v. United States, 883 F. Supp. 1076 (W.D. La. 1995) (provisions of Act
requiring CLEOs to perform background checks, destroy sworn statements, and provide
written response to those denied a handgun, held unconstitutional); McGee v. United
States, 863 F. Supp. 321 (S.D. Miss. 1994) (same); Frank v. United States, 860 F. Supp.
1030 (D. Vt. 1994) (provision of Act requiring CLEOs to perform background checks held
unconstitutional); Mack v. United States, 856 F. Supp. 1372 (D. Ariz. 1994), rev'd, 66 F.3d
1025 (9th Cir. 1995) (mandatory duty to conduct background checks violates the Tenth
Amendment); Printz v. United States, 854 F. Supp. 1503 (D. Mont. 1994), rev'd, 66 F.3d
1025 (9th Cir. 1995) (same); Koog v. United States, 852 F. Supp. 1376 (W.D. Tex. 1994)
(interim provisions not unconstitutional).
343. Mack v. United States, 66 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 1995).
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United States3' offers an excellent illustration of how the Tenth
Amendment, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in New York v.
United States,'4 has been used to challenge the validity of the Brady
Act.
Richard Mack and Jay Printz, as sheriffs and CLEOs in their
respective jurisdictions, filed suit in their local federal district courts
challenging the constitutionality of the Brady Act. 6  Mack and
Printz contended that the Act's provisions imposing duties upon them
violated the Tenth and Fifth Amendments.47 Both district courts
held that the Act, by imposing the duty to conduct background
checks, violated the Tenth Amendment as interpreted in New York
v. United States.? Both courts also held that the invalid portions
of the Brady Act were severable,, refusing to hold the entire Act
unconstitutional. 9
The sheriffs argued on appeal that Congress has no power to
impose duties on CLEOS and that the unconstitutional provisions
were not severable from the remainder of the Act."' Mack and
Printz contended that "[b]ecause [the Brady Act] issues commands to
CLEOs who are created by State law, [it] is beyond the powers
delegated to Congress in Article I, §8 of the Constitution, and violates
the Tenth Amendment.""35 Arguing that the Congress cannot issue
commands to state officials, they asserted that the three duties
imposed on CLEOs by the Act were invalid under New York v.
United States:
State governments are neither regional offices nor
administrative agencies of the federal government.... The
Constitution instead "leaves to the several States a residuary
and inviolable sovereignty," ... reserved explicitly to the
States by the Tenth Amendment.
344. Id.
345. 505 U.S. 144 (1992); see supra notes 102-10 and accompanying text.
346. Mack, 66 F.3d at 1028.
347. Id.
348. Id. (citing Mack v. United States, 856 F. Supp. 1372 (D. Ariz. 1994); Printz v.
United States, 854 F. Supp. 1503 (D. Mont. 1994)).
349. Id. On appeal, the sheriffs primarily disputed the holdings of severability, while
the government argued that the entire Act was constitutional.
350. Brief of Appellant Jay Printz, Mack v. United States, 66 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 1995)
(Nos. 94-36193, 95-35037) [hereinafter Appellant Printz's Opening Brief].
351. Id. at 14.
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Whatever the outer limits of that sovereignty may be,
one thing is clear: The Federal Government may not compel
the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory pro-
gram.
352
Using this language from New York, the sheriffs argued that the
Brady Act represented an unconstitutional "command" by the federal
government to the states to administer a federal regulatory pro-
gram.? If Congress was so concerned about handgun controls, it
should have attempted to regulate the field directly: "Where a fed-
eral interest is sufficiently strong to cause Congress to legislate, it
must do so directly; it may not conscript state governments as its
agents.
',3-
In upholding the Act, however, the Ninth Circuit panel rejected
the sheriffs' expansive reading of New York: "Although we concede
that there is language in New York that lends support to the view of
Mack and Printz, that language must be interpreted in the context in
which it was offered."3 "5  The Court instead adopted a narrower
view of New York. "New York, then, is best read as a case that...
[holds] the federal government is not entitled to coerce the States into
legislating or regulating according to the dictates of the federal
government.
35 6
According to the Court, the Brady Act does not represent a
mandate to the "states" in the sovereign sense discussed in New
York. 37 Rather, the Act "is a regulatory program aimed at individ-
uals and not the states."35 8  The Act does not regulate states as
sovereign units. "CLEOs are not being commanded to engage in the
central sovereign processes of enacting legislation or regulations.
They are not even being asked to produce a state policy, for which
352. Id. at 15-16 (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S at 178 (citations
omitted)).
353. Id. at 16-22.
354. Id. at 19 (quoting New York, 505 U.S. at 178). If the Congress chose instead to
impose the duty of background checks on federal officials (e.g., agents of the Federal
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms), it would have to enact this legislation pursuant
to an enumerated Article I power. Assuming that the Congress passed this legislation
under its commerce power, would it survive a constitutional challenge under United States
v. Lopez? See supra part IV.D.
355. Mack, 66 F.3d at 1030.
356. Id. (emphasis added).
357. Id.
358. Id. at 1031 (emphasis added).
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the state must bear political accountability., 359  The Court distin-
guished the Brady Act from the "take title" provision in New
York on the basis that the Act commands individual state officers,
not states as sovereign units.
361
C. Application of Thomas's Model to the Brady Act
The court's decision in Mack v. United States represents the first
skirmish in a battle that may ultimately be fought before the Supreme
Court. The sheriffs in Mack have requested an en banc hearing
before the entire Ninth Circuit. Moreover, a similar case is now
pending before the Fifth Circuit. 62 Should one of the circuits find
the Brady Act unconstitutional, the Supreme Court may very well
grant certiorari in 1996 to resolve the circuit split.
Whatever one thinks of the holding in Mack, the Court's
reasoning illustrates the weaknesses and limits of New York-based
Tenth Amendment challenges to federal laws. To avoid the holding
of New York, courts need only argue that the case at bar involves a
statute that regulates individuals rather than states as sovereign
units.363 With this distinction, courts can narrow the holding of New
York to include only the most extreme and coercive federal legisla-
tion. Justice Thomas's popular sovereignty model of reserved powers,
however, is much broader than the New York-based approach. Under
Thomas's model, the Brady Act would most likely be found unconsti-
tutional.
359. Id.
360. See supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
361. Circuit Judge Fernandez disagreed with this distinction, arguing that the Brady Act
does in fact "command" states directly in their sovereign capacity: "[The Act] is a step
toward concentrating power in the hands of the federal government, for it treats state
officials and workers as if they were mere federal employees." Mack, 66 F.3d at 1035
(Fernandez, J., dissenting). Fernandez argued that the Act, by regulating individuals in
their capacities as state officers, was precisely the kind of legislation that New York held
unconstitutional: "[S]tate officials are conscripted by the federal government to fulfill its
purposes and they can do nothing about that.... I assume that the Supreme Court meant
what it said when it said: ... 'The Federal Government may not compel the States to
enact or administer a federal regulatory program.'" Id. (quoting New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992)).
362. Julie Cohen, Tenth Amendment's Hired Gun: NRA Advocate Litigates Against
Federal Power, LEGAL TIMES, June 19,1995, at 1,12. The appeal is a consolidation of two
actions filed by sheriffs in Texas and Mississippi. See McGee v. United States, 863 F.
Supp. 321 (S.D. Miss. 1994); Koog v. United States, 852 F. Supp. 1376 (W.D. Tex. 1994).
363. See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
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Justice Thomas contends that all power stems from the people of
the states and that those powers "reserved" under the Tenth
Amendment include all powers not specifically granted to the federal
government by the Constitution." The remainder of the people's
powers not specifically granted to the federal government through the
Constitution are either delegated to state governments or retained by
the people. When the Constitution is silent about the exercise of a
particular power, the federal government lacks that power and the
states enjoy it.
Justice Thomas might approach the Brady Act as follows. The
Constitution is silent on the issue of handgun controls, and the duties
imposed by the Act on state officials are not authorized by any
enumerated power. The power to impose background checks and
waiting periods is thus "reserved" to the people of the states, and the
Brady Act is therefore unconstitutional as violative of the Tenth
Amendment.
1. The duties imposed on the states by the Brady Act do not fall
within the commerce power of Congress
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Lopez,36 the Brady
Act would undoubtedly have been found constitutional as a valid
exercise of Congress's commerce power.3 66  However, Lopez
appears to have created a broad exception to the Court's otherwise
lenient review under the rational basis test. Where the regulated
activity is not of a commercial nature, it must have a "substantial
effect" on interstate commerce in order to be within the reach of the
commerce power of Congress.367 Under Lopez, only "channels" and
"instrumentalities" of interstate commerce are subject to the rational
basis test.3"
Handguns are not "channels" of interstate commerce within the
meaning of Lopez. The Lopez majority cites to Heart of Atlanta
Motel, Inc. v. United States, 369 which upheld the federal law prohibit-
ing discrimination by hotels and restaurants, as an example of
protecting interstate commerce channels.370 Unlike public accom-
364. See supra notes 200-03 and accompanying text.
365. See supra part IV.D.
366. See supra part IV.D.
367. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1630 (1995).
368. Id. at 1629.
369. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
370. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629.
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modations that regularly advertise for out-of-state customers and
whose regular clientele are mainly from out-of-state,371 handguns do
not serve as a regular channel through which interstate commerce
flows. Similarly, handguns are not mere "instrumentalities" of
interstate commerce within the meaning of Lopez. The Lopez
majority cites to several cases upholding Congress's power to regulate
the railroads as examples of regulating the instrumentalities of
interstate commerce. 2 Unlike railroads that exist for the purpose
of transporting goods across state lines, handguns do not serve as a
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce.
The regulation of handguns thus falls squarely within Lopez's
"not of a commercial nature" exception. Under Lopez, the Brady
Act is therefore not subject to review under the deferential rational
basis test. Rather, the sale of handguns must have a "substantial
effect" on interstate commerce in order to be within the reach of the
commerce power of Congress. Armed with the "substantial effects"
test, a future majority might well argue that the relationship between
handgun sales and interstate commerce is too attenuated and
tangential to uphold the Brady Act as a valid exercise of congressio-
nal commerce power.373
2. The duties imposed on the states by the Brady Act are not
authorized by any other enumerated power
The Constitution is silent on the issue of handgun controls.374
Moreover, nothing in the Brady Act suggests any enumerated power
in the Constitution which justifies the imposition of duties on state
officials. 375 "The Constitution delegates the enforcement of federal
371. Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 258-59.
372. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629.
373. Of course, as noted above, this line of reasoning would face some serious
obstacles. What exactly constitutes a "substantial effect?" How much deference should
the Court give to congressional findings of an interstate commerce "nexus?" See supra
notes 317-20 and accompanying text; see also Mack v. United States, 66 F.3d 1025, 1028
n.5 (9th Cir. 1995) ("The legislative history of the Brady Act also contains findings that
gun violence affects commerce, and we accept those findings.").
374. The Constitution's only direct reference to firearms, the Second Amendment, does
not appear to support congressional preemption of gun control: "A well regulated Militia,
being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear
Arms, shall not be infringed." U.S. CONST. amend. II. Indeed, insofar as it applies, the
Second Amendment supports the inference that the power to impose waiting periods and
background checks is reserved to the people of the States under the Tenth Amendment.
375. Appellant Printz's Opening Brief, supra note 350, at 22.
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law to the President, and is explicit concerning limited duties of the
States vis-a-vis federal law enforcement. 37 6 Three provisions of the
Constitution involve federal-state law enforcement relations.3"
None of these provisions empower Congress to "'commandeer' state
governments into the service of federal regulatory purposes.
378
The Constitution empowers Congress "[t]o provide for calling
forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrec-
tions and repel Invasions."379 It also allows Congress to organize,
arm, and discipline the militia, presumably in time of war.380 How-
ever, while the Constitution allows Congress to. "call forth" state
national guards and militias to aid in the national defense, it does not
empower Congress to command local sheriffs to enforce federal gun
control regulations.
381
The Constitution also addresses law enforcement. "The United
States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form
of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and
on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the
Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence."" The
federal government can only protect a state "against domestic
violence" when the state so applies.3 3 Even if a state were to apply
for such protection, nowhere does the Constitution grant the federal
government the power to conscript state officials, except for militia
officers, for this effort.3"
Finally, the Constitution empowers the federal courts to compel
a state governor to extradite a fugitive to the state having jurisdiction
over the crime.8" While "[t]he commands of the Extradition Clause
are mandatory, and afford no discretion to the executive officers or
courts of the asylum State," '386 this provision of the Constitution has
376. Id.
377. Id. at 23.
378. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 175 (1992).
379. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
380. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 16.
381. Appellant Printz's Opening Brief, supra note 350, at 23.
382. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
383. Appellant Printz's Opening Brief, supra note 350, at 24.
384. Id.
385. U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2.
386. Appellant Printz's Opening Brief, supra note 350, at 24 (quoting Puerto Rico v.
Branstad, 483 U.S. 219, 227 (1987)).
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no obvious application to the issue of congressional commands to
state law enforcement officials to enforce federal gun control laws.
3. The power to impose background checks and waiting periods is
thus "reserved" to the people of the states
The duties the Brady Act imposes on state officials are not
authorized by any enumerated power in the Constitution. The Act is
not a valid exercise of Congress's commerce power under Lopez. The
Constitution is simply silent on this issue. Accordingly, under Justice
Thomas's popular sovereignty model, the power to impose back-
ground checks and waiting periods is "reserved" to the people of the
states, and the Brady Act is therefore unconstitutional as violative of
the Tenth Amendment.
VI. CONCLUSION
Justice Thomas's dissent in Thornton proposes a model of
reserved powers under the Tenth Amendment that would give the
states much greater latitude to act absent specific constitutional
preemption. By characterizing the states' reserved powers as a
function of "popular sovereignty" rather than "original powers,"
Thomas lays the foundation for a new and expansive approach to
Tenth Amendment jurisprudence. As the discussion of the Brady Act
shows, the popular sovereignty model would call into question many
federal laws, potentially returning significant portions of federal power
to the states. Depending on whether the Supreme Court's "federal-
ism coalition" is able to build a five-vote majority in the future, the
Tenth Amendment could become the basis for the judicial restoration
of limited, decentralized government.
Former Delaware Governor Pete du Pont has written that "[o]f
the ten amendments constituting the Bill of Rights, none has been so
humbled as the Tenth. ' ,31 However, federalism advocates like du
Pont believe that their moment has finally arrived: "[T]he Tenth
Amendment clearly fits the temper of our times. The conservative
revolution that is in progress around the globe is devolving pow-
er-from governments to people, from groups to individuals, and from
central governments to local ones. ,381 Many proponents of the
387. Id. at 24-25.
388. Pete du Pont, Pleading the Tenth, NAT'L REv., Nov. 27, 1995, at 50, 50.
389. Id. at 51. Governor du Pont argues that the Supreme Court "rationalized [the
Tenth Amendment] out of existence" because "the Tenth Amendment goes against the
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Tenth Amendment contend that technological and economic trends
associated with the information age will advance the cause of
federalism. Syndicated columnist George E Will writes that:
[T]he revival of the constitutional theory of decentralization
was fostered by a scientific event in 1971-the Intel Corpo-
ration's introduction of the first microprocessor. A decade
later there were millions of such slivers of silicon in personal
computers and millions more in fax machines, cellphones,
voice-mail systems and other devices.... Today the Fra-
mers' constitutional vision of decentralized governance, until
quite recently regarded as a quaint antique, is being rejuve-
nated by modernity.3"
It remains to be seen whether constitutional federalism is truly on the
verge of being "rejuvenated by modernity." Without a doubt, Justice
Thomas has left a lasting mark and has done much to restore the
Framers' vision through his popular sovereignty model of reserved
powers.
Vince Lee Farhat*
grain of conventional liberalism." Id. at 50. He contends that the Tenth Amendment "is
the antithesis of the liberal belief that society's elite groups-academics, the judiciary, civil
servants, bureaucrats-know better than we do what is good for us." Id.
390. George F. Will, Events and Arguments, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 16, 1995, at 88, 88.
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